Maryland Law Review
Volume 73 | Issue 2

Copyright Crime and Punishment: The First
Amendment's Proportionality Problem
Margot Kaminski

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr
Part of the First Amendment Commons, and the Intellectual Property Commons
Recommended Citation
Margot Kaminski, Copyright Crime and Punishment: The First Amendment's Proportionality Problem, 73 Md. L. Rev. 587 (2014)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr/vol73/iss2/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Maryland Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please contact
smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.

Article 5

COPYRIGHT CRIME AND PUNISHMENT: THE FIRST
AMENDMENT’S PROPORTIONALITY PROBLEM
MARGOT KAMINSKI
ABSTRACT
The United States is often considered to be the most speechprotective country in the world. Paradoxically, the features that
have led to this reputation have created areas in which the United
States is in fact less speech protective than other countries. The
Supreme Court’s increasing use of a categorical approach to the
First Amendment has created a growing divide between the U.S.
approach to reconciling copyright and free expression and the
proportionality analysis adopted by most of the rest of the world.
In practice, the U.S. categorical approach to the First Amendment minimizes opportunities for judicial oversight of copyright.
Consequently, as corporations lobby for ever-increasing penalties and enforcement mechanisms, the United States has fostered
one of the world’s least speech-friendly criminal copyright regimes. The United States is exporting that regime, including its
presumption that copyright is unrelated to freedom of expression.
Instead of exporting flawed presumptions, the United States
should reintegrate proportionality concepts into First Amendment
doctrine to examine the proportionality of sanctions for speech
that has functionally been deemed unprotected by the First
Amendment.
INTRODUCTION
The United States is often considered more speech-protective than any
other country. The First Amendment requires the government to recognize
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that the remedy for bad speech is more speech, not punishment.1 Only a
few categories of speech are historically not subject to First Amendment
protection.2 Paradoxically, however, the Supreme Court’s First Amendment doctrine, which is usually very speech-protective, has created substantive areas where the United States is less speech-protective than other nations.
The United States, unlike other constitutional regimes, uses a tiered
approach to constitutional analysis, familiar to many as the choice between
strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and rational basis review.3 First
Amendment doctrine offers a striking example of this tiered approach.
With the exception of content-neutral speech regulations and areas covered
by intermediate scrutiny,4 speech is either categorically protected in the
United States or not protected at all.5 When speech falls into a category that
is not protected, courts effectively abdicate judicial review of legislative
sanctions.6

1. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“If there
be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes
of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence.”); President Obama’s
Remarks at the U.N. General Assembly, CNN (Sept. 25, 2012, 10:53 AM),
http://news.blogs.cnn.com/2012/09/25/president-obamas-prepared-remarks-at-the-u-n-generalassembly (“[I]n a diverse society . . . the strongest weapon against hateful speech is not repression,
it is more speech—the voices of tolerance that rally against bigotry and blasphemy, and lift up the
values of understanding and mutual respect. I know that not all countries in this body share this
particular understanding of the protection of free speech—we recognize that.”).
2. See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544 (2012) (listing the following categories of exceptions to First Amendment protection: “incite[ment of ] imminent lawless action, obscenity, defamation, speech integral to criminal conduct, so-called ‘fighting’ words, child pornography, fraud, true threats, and speech presenting some grave and imminent threat the government
has the power to prevent” (citations omitted)).
3. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Post-Liberal Judging: The Roles of Categorization and Balancing,
63 U. COLO. L. REV. 293, 296–97 (1992).
4. See generally Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Test That Ate Everything: Intermediate Scrutiny in
First Amendment Jurisprudence, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 783, 788–89 (2007) (articulating the development of intermediate scrutiny and the categories included within its analysis); Geoffrey R.
Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 48–50 (1987) (explaining the Court’s
content-neutral jurisprudence).
5. See Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1767 (2004) (noting that “questions
about the involvement of the First Amendment in the first instance are often far more consequential than are the issues surrounding the strength of protection”); Sullivan, supra note 3, at 296 (observing that the tiered system, “[w]hen applied in its strong bipolar form, such a two-tier system
functions as a de facto categorical mode of analysis despite its nominal use of balancing rhetoric”). But see Joseph Blocher, Categoricalism and Balancing in First and Second Amendment
Analysis, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 375, 397 (2009) (observing that First Amendment doctrine represents
a blending of categorical and balancing approaches).
6. See infra text Part III.A.
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Copyright law is a casualty of the First Amendment’s on-off switch.7
By contrast, courts around the world increasingly balance copyright against
fundamental rights, including speech.8 This Article identifies the paradox
that, at least in copyright law, the United States is less solicitous of speech
interests than other countries and international courts. The lack of speech
protection in U.S. copyright jurisprudence results in large part from the
American use of categorical review in free speech analysis.9 This Article
partakes in comparative constitutionalism by comparing the U.S. approach
to that of other countries and international bodies.
The First Amendment’s on-off switch provides minimal judicial oversight of the copyright regime in the United States.10 Consequently, over the
last two decades the United States has fostered one of the world’s least
speech-friendly criminal copyright regimes. This Article contributes to the
sparse but growing literature on criminal copyright by addressing the role
free trade agreements play in propagating the U.S. criminal copyright
standard internationally.11
Part I of this Article compares the proportionality analysis that most of
the world’s constitutional courts use when reviewing laws implicating fundamental rights with the Supreme Court’s tiered framework of review in
First Amendment doctrine. Part II discusses how U.S. tiered review has
functionally placed copyright law outside of First Amendment analysis,
while international courts and other institutions have acknowledged that
copyright laws can affect and impinge on free speech rights. This Article

7. See Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 891 (2012) (concluding that Congress may take
works out of the public domain and restore copyright protection, noting that “nothing in the historical record, congressional practice, or our own jurisprudence warrants exceptional First Amendment solicitude”); see also Michael Birnhack, The Copyright Law and Free Speech Affair: Making-up and Breaking-up, 43 IDEA 233, 236, 296–98 (2003) (discussing “the need to relocate the
[copyright] conflict discourse in a constitutional framework”).
8. See infra Part II.
9. See infra Part II.
10. See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 890–91 (refusing to apply heightened First Amendment scrutiny
to the withdrawal of works from the public domain and clarifying that weak review applies to all
copyright claims except when Congress alters “the ‘traditional contours’ of copyright protection,”
meaning “the ‘idea/expression distinction’ and the ‘fair use’ defense”); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537
U.S. 186, 221 (2003) (refusing to apply heightened scrutiny to the Copyright Term Extension Act,
which lengthened copyright’s term length).
11. See generally Lydia Pallas Loren, Digitization, Commodification, Criminalization: The
Evolution of Criminal Copyright Infringement and the Importance of the Willfulness Requirement,
77 WASH. U. L. Q. 835, 837–38 (1999) (analyzing criminal copyright infringement in light of the
No Electronic Theft (NET) Act); Geraldine Szott Moohr, Defining Overcriminalization Through
Cost-Benefit Analysis: The Example of Criminal Copyright Laws, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 783, 785–87
(2005) (exploring cost-benefit analysis as a method to defining the overcriminalization of copyright law).
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examines the differences between the United States and international approaches, and concludes that the divide between them is growing.
Part III addresses some of the problems created by the U.S. approach.
There has been insufficient judicial oversight of copyright law in the United
States to prevent its expansion, especially in the criminal realm. As a consequence of ever-increasing penalties and expansive criminal enforcement
mechanisms, the U.S. copyright regime now raises substantial speech concerns. The regime can be overbroad, can result in collateral censorship, can
give rise to chilling effects, and can allow for prior restraints on speech.
Part IV explores how the United States is attempting to export its copyright regime internationally in free trade agreements, and the recent rejection of those efforts in Europe through popular protest. Finally, in Part V,
this Article uses the example of criminal copyright law to identify pathologies of the categorical approach and offer a suggestion. The United States’
current efforts to export criminal copyright enforcement, along with a presumptively categorical approach to reconciling copyright and speech, conflict with public intuitions about free speech held by people around the
world. Instead, courts should take the opposite tact and reintegrate elements of proportionality analysis into First Amendment jurisprudence. Doing so would provide a more complete and nuanced understanding of freedom of expression and return the United States to its position as the most
speech-protective country in the world.
I. PROPORTIONALITY ANALYSIS VERSUS THE CATEGORICAL APPROACH
Most of the world’s constitutional courts employ a balancing test when
reviewing laws that implicate the protection of fundamental rights.12 The
balancing test, referred to as proportionality analysis, is triggered by a prima facie showing of rights infringement13 and resembles a weaker version
of strict scrutiny. Proportionality analysis involves four steps. First, the
court examines whether the government has a legitimate purpose for the
law.14 Second, it examines whether the means employed are rationally related to that legitimate purpose.15 Third, it deploys a least-restrictive-means
test to ensure that the law does not curtail the fundamental right any more

12. See Alec Stone Sweet & Jud Mathews, Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism, 47 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 72, 74 (2008) (“By the end of the 1990s, virtually every
effective system of constitutional justice in the world . . . had embraced the main tenets of [proportionality analysis].”).
13. Id. at 75.
14. Id.
15. Id.
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than is necessary.16 Finally, the court balances the benefits of the narrowly
tailored law against the costs incurred by the infringement of the right, given the facts of the case.17
Under proportionality analysis, courts may end up balancing one fundamental right against another. A court typically considers how seriously a
given right has been implicated by a case and balances the depth of this incursion against the strength of the government’s invoked interest.18 The
more extensive the government’s incursion into the core of a given right,
the more serious the government’s purpose must be.19 Sometimes the government invokes the protection of one right as justification for encroaching
on another.20 The court then weighs the two rights, considering the strength
of the right protected and the severity of government encroachment onto the
right being impinged.21
The United States, by contrast, uses a tiered system of review for
rights violations.22 The court chooses which type of review to apply: strict
scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, or rational basis review.23 Each tier, at least
on first blush, contains elements of a balancing test; strict scrutiny, for example, requires that regulations be narrowly tailored to a compelling government interest.24 But as the U.S. tiered doctrine has developed, the tiers
have become increasingly rigid.25 Strict scrutiny, especially in First
Amendment doctrine, is now famously close to being “fatal in fact.”26 As a
16. Id.
17. Id. at 75–76.
18. Jud Mathews & Alec Stone Sweet, All Things in Proportion? American Rights Review
and the Problem of Balancing, 60 EMORY L.J. 797, 837 (2011).
19. Id.
20. See id. (comparing a court’s ability to recognize a person’s consumption of child pornography as free expression, while allowing the government to regulate the sexual exploitation of
children against the protection of political protest from state regulation).
21. Id. at 837–38 (finding that the right to free expression in child pornography is minimal in
comparison to the right of political speech, which is considered a fundamental right).
22. Id. at 836, 838; see also Bernhard Schlink, Proportionality in Constitutional Law: Why
Everywhere but Here?, 22 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 291, 297 (2012) (explaining that generally,
the United States protects rights categorically but also uses a “means-end analysis that is more-orless through proportionality analysis”).
23. Mathews & Sweet, supra note 18, at 836.
24. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010).
25. Mathews & Sweet, supra note 18, at 837.
26. Gerald Gunther, Foreword, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972). But see Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59
VAND. L. REV. 793, 795–96, 844 (2006) (pointing out that in Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515
U.S. 200, 237 (1995), the Supreme Court “wish[ed] to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is
‘strict in theory, but fatal in fact,’” and showing that strict scrutiny is not always deadly, but that it
is “most fatal in the area of free speech”).
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consequence, U.S. courts often do not balance rights against each other; instead, their decisions frequently turn on which standard of review they
choose to apply.27
A. The First Amendment’s Categorical Approach
The Supreme Court’s approach to the First Amendment is a noted example of U.S. constitutional exceptionalism and the U.S. preference for
tiered review.28 In fact, the Supreme Court initially created strict scrutiny in
a First Amendment case.29 Justices Felix Frankfurter and Hugo Black differed over whether the Court should use a balancing test or an absolutist
approach to free speech.30 The Court created strict scrutiny as a way to reconcile these two approaches.31 Strict scrutiny, as it was first introduced,
functioned as a weighted balancing test. It thus represented a compromise
between absolutism and balancing.32 Strict scrutiny as originally formulated allowed the court to perform a balancing test, but put a heavy thumb on
the scale in favor of the importance of free speech.33 Therefore, early forms
of strict scrutiny more closely resembled proportionality analysis.34
Strict scrutiny, however, evolved from being a proportionality test to
more of an on-off switch.35 Content-based regulations of speech are now all
subject to strict scrutiny and, therefore, are almost always found to be unconstitutional.36 As many know, however, the First Amendment does not
unconditionally protect all speech. The Court has developed ways to devi-

27. See infra Part II.
28. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
29. See Stephen A. Siegel, The Origin of the Compelling State Interest Test and Strict Scrutiny, 48 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 355, 361–80 (2006) (discussing the “Birth of the Compelling State Interest Test and Strict Scrutiny” as part of the First Amendment jurisprudence in 1963, when used
in three opinions written by “high-protectionist Justices Brennan and Goldberg”).
30. Compare Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 61 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting) (discussing the absolutist approach), with Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 524–25
(1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in judgment) (discussing the balancing test of “competing interests”).
31. Siegel, supra note 29, at 375.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 376.
34. See Mathews & Sweet, supra note 18, at 841 (noting that “[a]s we found with respect to
earlier versions of strict scrutiny, American judges considered [proportionality analysis] to be inherent parts of the judicial repertoire”).
35. See supra notes 4–5 and accompanying text.
36. But see Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2728–29, 2731 (2010)
(upholding a content-based speech regulation under strict scrutiny because national interest in
combating terrorism was sufficiently important and law was narrowly tailored to further that important end).
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ate from the tiered review’s protective framework in order to arrive at the
conclusion that some speech is not protected.37
The following are a few examples of how the Court arrives at a nonspeech-protective decision within current First Amendment doctrine. The
Court is often uncomfortable applying a pure tiered review, even in the First
Amendment context.38 First, there are some areas of law that clearly apply
to speech but are not covered by the First Amendment, such as securities
regulation, antitrust law, and bans on criminal solicitation.39 Once the
Court finds itself in a topic covered by the First Amendment, one approach
it uses to get around the First Amendment is to label certain activities unexpressive, and thus not subject to First Amendment protection.40 Another
way courts get around strict scrutiny to subject speech regulation to light
intermediate scrutiny.41 A third approach to circumventing the First
Amendment is to determine that the government regulation at hand is in
fact content-neutral, not content-based; this triggers intermediate scrutiny.42
A final approach creates whole categories of speech that are recognized as
unprotected, even though they are also recognized as speech.43 Thus, the
substance of a First Amendment decision usually involves following a series of rules, logical or not, that categorize both the type of regulation and
the type of expression, rather than weighing the strength of the speaker’s
speech right against the strength of the governmental interest.44
I do not want to overstate my claim as to the First Amendment’s categorical nature; within intermediate scrutiny cases, for instance, the Court is
37. See Mathews & Sweet, supra note 18, at 836.
38. The Court’s multiplying approaches to taking speech outside of First Amendment protection exemplify what Mathews and Sweet call the pathology of doctrinal instability. Mathews &
Sweet, supra note 18, at 836–37. Doctrinal instability occurs when U.S. courts find themselves
needing to escape from the bifurcated results created by tiered review. Id. at 847. Mathews and
Sweet posit that courts then create intermediate tiers of review to engage in more subtle judicial
reasoning resembling proportionality analysis, such as intermediate scrutiny. Id. at 846–47.
39. See Schauer, supra note 5, at 1771.
40. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 27 (1971) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting that
“Cohen’s absurd and immature antic, in my view, was mainly conduct and little speech,” and not
covered by the First Amendment); United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376–78 (1968) (creating the test for determining when conduct is expressive, but finding that the government could
constitutionally regulate the burning of a draft card).
41. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 661–62 (1994) (finding that the “appropriate standard by which to evaluate the constitutionality of must-carry is the intermediate level of
scrutiny applicable to content-neutral restrictions that impose an incidental burden on speech”).
42. Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48–49 (1986).
43. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
44. See Schauer, supra note 5, at 1769 (noting that “[w]hen the First Amendment does show
up, the full arsenal of First Amendment rules, principles, standards, distinctions . . . becomes
available”); Sullivan, supra note 3, at 296 (observing that outcomes can be determined at the
threshold of determining which test is applied, “[b]ut this is not real balancing”).
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likely to engage in real balancing of speech and other values.45 The troubling phenomenon I identify here, however, is that when language falls into
one of the categories of speech that is covered by the First Amendment but
receive no First Amendment protection—such as fraud, true threats, or obscenity—proportionality analysis can allow foreign and international courts
to be more speech-protective than the U.S. categorical approach conventionally permits.46 Proportionality analysis does not guarantee more protection, but “[y]ou simply cannot do everything with boxes that you can do
with balancing.”47
Today’s Supreme Court is particularly enamored with the categorical
approach in its First Amendment cases.48 In recent cases, the Court has adhered to the “historical and traditional categories” of exceptions to First
Amendment protection, refused to apply a balancing test to create new exceptions, and applied strict scrutiny.49 The Court explained that the “vast
realm of free speech and thought always protected in our tradition can still
thrive, and even be furthered, by adherence to those categories and rules.”50
The two-tiered and categorical approach to First Amendment protection has some distinct advantages.51 Formalism is highly speech-protective

45. See, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 533–35 (2001) (weighing the public interest
in disclosure against the privacy harms done to the victim of a wiretap and finding protection under intermediate scrutiny); Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173,
183–84 (1999) (finding that the promotion of legal gambling constitutes commercial speech protected by the First Amendment and thus subject to intermediate scrutiny); see also Sullivan, supra
note 5, at 297 (pointing out that in contrast to strict scrutiny and rationality review, “intermediate
scrutiny is an overtly balancing mode”).
46. But see Heidi Kitrosser, Containing Unprotected Speech, 57 FLA. L. REV. 843, 869–78
(2005) (proposing a containment strategy for regulations applied to unprotected speech that requires courts to ask whether the content-based regulation of unprotected speech relates substantially to harm at which the larger unprotected category is directed, and whether the regulation
threatens speech not likely to be restricted through the general category).
47. Sullivan, supra note 3, at 308–09 (discussing the practical differences between the categorization and balancing techniques).
48. See id. at 306 (noting the “active controversy” over categorization and balancing in constitutional law).
49. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544 (2012) (noting that “content-based restrictions on speech have been permitted, as a general matter, only when confined to the few ‘historic and traditional categories’” (quoting United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468 (2010)));
Stevens, 559 U.S. at 470 (“The First Amendment’s guarantee of free speech does not extend only
to categories of speech that survive an ad hoc balancing of relative social costs and benefits.”);
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 246 (2002) (refusing to extend the First Amendment
exception for child pornography to digital child pornography).
50. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2544.
51. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105,
128 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment) (explaining that “[t]he case before us presents
the opportunity to adhere to a surer test for content-based cases and to avoid using an unnecessary
formulation, one with the capacity to weaken central protections of the First Amendment”); see
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when courts use it to refuse to create new categories of unprotected speech,
as the Supreme Court has recently done.52 By creating categories of protected and unprotected speech, categorical analysis also gives rise to fewer
borderline cases, and thus operates as a more predictable and less costly
system for most defendants.53
The Court’s preference for categorical analysis is supported by substantial historical examples of the inherent flaws of balancing tests. First
Amendment doctrine once required balancing. Under the “clear-andpresent-danger test,” courts were required to make an inquiry into the “imminence and magnitude of the danger said to flow from the particular utterance” and balance the “character of the evil” and likelihood of its occurrence “against the need for free and unfettered expression.”54 The use of
this test to defeat First Amendment claims in the 1950s gave First Amendment balancing a bad reputation among U.S. speech advocates.55
The United States, however, has not always been against balancing.
Additionally, the First Amendment today may not be as categorical as the
current Court assumes it to be.56 The current Court’s reliance on formalism
neglects to consider historical nuances of First Amendment application.57
In the past, the Court has circumvented First Amendment formalism in
several ways. It has reached within unprotected categories of speech to refine the boundaries of historically prohibited categories of speech.58 It has
also GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES 396–410 (2004) (discussing the unprecedented First
Amendment activity for the Supreme Court as a result of the Cold War, specifically focusing on
the significance of Dennis v. United States).
52. See Stevens, 559 U.S. at 470–72; Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2544.
53. See, e.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merch. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733–35 (2011) (applying Stevens in an easy and straightforward manner, and firmly rejecting a balancing test as “startling and
dangerous,” holding instead that the categorical approach is better because it clearly articulates the
details of the obscenity exception to the First Amendment).
54. Landmark Commc’ns, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 842–43 (1978). The clear-and present-danger test was established in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), which found that
the government could regulate Communist speech advocating the overthrow of the government at
some indistinct time in the future. Id. at 515–17.
55. See, e.g., Laurent B. Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424,
1428–49 (1962) (arguing that the clear-and-present danger balancing test has been over applied
and overused); Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV.
245, 249–50 (1961) (claiming that the Dennis opinion, which argued against an absolutist interpretation of exceptions to First Amendment rights, was predicated on an erroneous conception of
the absolutist interpretation).
56. Mathews & Sweet, supra note 18, at 813–14.
57. Id.
58. New York Times Co.v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) (explaining that “libel can
claim no talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations”); see also Miller v. California, 413
U.S. 15, 18–20, 23–24 (1973) (observing that obscenity is not constitutionally protected, but recognizing the need for “standards . . . used to identify obscene material”).
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banned regulation of speech within the unprotected categories when the
regulation was done for a purpose unrelated to why those categories of
speech were banned.59 In addition, the Court has rejected the state’s use of
“any way deemed necessary” to go after speech that did fall into one of the
unprotected categories.60
On the surface, current First Amendment doctrine seems to require
tiered review combined with an analysis of categorical exceptions to First
Amendment protection.61 At a closer glance, however, this makeshift twoprong approach is disintegrating, which demonstrates a possible inherent
doctrinal instability.62 It thus may be time to develop a less ad hoc approach to the regulation of speech that falls into an unprotected category.
Courts forego First Amendment formalism in favor of balancing tests
in a number of areas. The most prominent example is the Supreme Court’s
expansion of its use of intermediate scrutiny.63 When the Court wants to
balance speech against other values, it employs intermediate scrutiny. The
John Doe standard developed by lower courts, which is used to protect
anonymous speakers from having their identity revealed in frivolous lawsuits, is an example of the regular use of a balancing test.64 The John Doe
standard requires courts to balance the speaker’s First Amendment rights
against the strength of the plaintiff’s prima facie case, among other fac-

59. R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383–84 (1992) (finding that even though the government can regulate true threats and fighting words, it cannot designate a content-based subcategory
for regulation within categorically unprotected speech).
60. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 559–63 (1969) (rejecting the idea that since obscenity
is not constitutionally protected, states are free to deal with it in “any way deemed necessary”).
61. See Sullivan, supra note 3, at 301 (noting that “[t]wo-tier review, like overtly taxonomic
or categorical analysis . . . uses classification at the threshold to cut off further serious debate . . . .
Intermediate scrutiny requires far more evaluative work after the threshold has been crossed.”).
62. See Mathews & Sweet, supra note 18, at 837.
63. See Blocher, supra note 5, at 391–92 (referring to intermediate scrutiny as “the Test That
Ate Everything”).
64. See generally Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Anonymity in Cyberspace: What Can We Learn
from John Doe?, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1373, 1374–1384 (2009) (describing the evolution of the John
Doe standard and the First Amendment doctrines created to protect the anonymity of Internet
speech in libel suits).
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tors.65 Trademark jurisprudence also contains a balancing test that involves
free speech.66
In recent years, however, the Court has further entrenched First
Amendment formalism and the categorical approach.67 That formalism has
surprising consequences with respect to the First Amendment’s relative protectiveness of categorically unprotected speech. A purely formalistic approach to the First Amendment runs the danger of rejecting all speech that
falls into a historically unprotected category, without considering the circumstances or proportionality of the state’s response to the speech.68 Even
categorically unprotected speech can have at least some value; moreover, it
can be used as a vehicle for restricting protected speech.69
B. International Free Speech and Proportionality Analysis
In contrast to the United States, most other countries use proportionality analysis to examine restrictions on speech rights.70 Proportionality analysis sometimes requires balancing speech against other rights, which can
lead to excessive judicial deference to legislatures.71 For borderline cases,
however, proportionality analysis can be more protective than categorical
analysis because it always requires balancing the purpose of regulations
against the right of the speaker to speak.72 There are no categories of
speech that fall outside of the balancing test entirely, with the exception of
four types of expression that states are actively required to prohibit.73
65. Id. at 1376–77 (“[C]ourts are beginning to converge on a set of standards to balance the
right to speak anonymously with the rights of those injured by the defamatory anonymous
speech.”); see also Jocelyn Hanamirian, The Right To Remain Anonymous: Anonymous Speakers,
Confidential Sources and the Public Good, 35 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 119, 120 (2012) (stating that
courts must “‘balance the defendant’s First Amendment right of anonymous free speech against
the strength of the prima facie case presented and the necessity for the disclosure of the anonymous defendant’s identity’” (quoting Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe, No. 3, 775 A.2d 756, 760–61
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001))).
66. Mark Bartholomew & John Tehranian, An Intersystemic View of Intellectual Property
and Free Speech, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 41–44 (2013).
67. See supra Part I.
68. See Michael Coenen, Of Speech and Sanctions: Toward a Penalty-Sensitive Approach to
the First Amendment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 991, 997, 1027–44 (2012) (arguing that the Court
should take a penalty-sensitive approach to speech analysis).
69. Kitrosser, supra note 46, at 848.
70. Stephen Gardbaum, The Myth and the Reality of American Constitutional Exceptionalsim, 107 MICH. L. REV. 391, 396–97 (2008).
71. T. Jeremy Gunn, Deconstructing Proportionality in Limitations Analysis, 19 EMORY
INT’L L. REV. 465, 483–487 (2005).
72. Id. at 470 (citing Soering v. U.K., 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 110 (1989)).
73. U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of
Opinion and Expression, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the
Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, ¶ 80, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/20/17 (June 4, 2012) (by
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Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(“ICCPR”) exemplifies the international use of proportionality analysis to
protect freedom of expression.74 Article 19 protects the right to freedom of
expression, including the “freedom to seek, receive and impart information
and ideas of all kinds.”75 The Article 19 right applies to all media, including the Internet.76 It is explicitly subject, however, to “certain restrictions.”77
Any restrictions on freedom of expression under Article 19 are subject
to a three-part test familiar to courts around the world.78 The three-part test
mandates that any speech restriction must be provided for by law, protect a
legitimate interest, and be both necessary and the “least restrictive means”
required to protect that interest.79 The three-part test is a form of proportionality analysis.
Courts around the world have applied this three-part test when addressing exceptions to freedom of expression; this application can be seen
in two regional human rights treaties.80 The European Court of Human
Frank La Rue) [hereinafter La Rue 2012] (referencing report A/66/290). States are required under
international law to prohibit the following: child pornography; incitement to genocide; incitement
to discrimination through advocacy of national, racial, or religious hatred; and incitement to terrorism. Id.
74. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 19(2), opened for signature
Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR], available at http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx. The ICCPR, as ratified by
the Senate, is non-self-executing and therefore is not binding law in the United States.
75. Id.
76. Molly Land, Toward an International Law of the Internet, 54 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 4
(forthcoming 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2177993.
77. ICCPR, supra note 74, art. 19(3). The restrictions include “(a) [f]or respect of the rights
or reputations of others; (b) [f]or the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals.” Id.
78. Gunn, supra note 71, at 467–68 (describing how the proportionate measure must be satisfied by three criteria).
79. ICCPR, supra note 74, art. 19(3); see also U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and
Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Report of the Special Rapporteur
on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, ¶ 24, U.N.
Doc. A/HRC/17/27 (May 16, 2011) (by Frank La Rue) [hereinafter La Rue 2011],
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/17session/A.HRC.17.27_en.pdf.
80. See, e.g., Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 10.2, Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. No. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered in force Sept.
3, 1953), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf; Organization of
American States, American Convention on Human Rights art. 13.2, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S.
No.
36,
1144
U.N.T.S.
123,
available
at
http://www.hrcr.org/docs/American_Convention/oashr4.html; Organization of African Unity, African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights art. 9, June 27, 1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 217, available
at http://www.achpr.org/instruments/achpr/; see also Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, App. No.
6538/74, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 245, ¶ 49 (1979) (requiring the law to be accessible and “formulated
with sufficient precision to enable the citizen to regulate his conduct”); Lingens v. Austria, App.
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Rights (“ECHR”) has explained that exceptions to freedom of expression
“must be narrowly interpreted and the necessity for any restrictions must be
convincingly established.”81 The Inter-American Court of Human Rights
has noted that a restriction on freedom of expression “must be so framed as
not to limit the right . . . more than is necessary.”82
The United States is an outlier, as compared to the rest of the world, in
using a predominantly categorical approach to speech rights.83 Usually, the
categorical approach means that the United States is more speech-protective
than other countries because most speech regulation is subject to strict scrutiny, which is usually fatal-in-fact.84 But for the liminal cases, the categorical approach can be less protective than a universal balancing test.85 Comparatively, the United States is underprotective of categorically rejected
speech.86 Once a category of speech has been deemed unprotected, the
United States allows liability for all speech within the boundaries of that
categorical carve-out.87 The United States fails to provide judicial oversight
over the type and scope of sanctions applied to unprotected speech.88
II. COPYRIGHT AS A CARVE-OUT, OR WEIGHED AGAINST SPEECH
Copyright law is an example of one such carve-out.89 First Amendment doctrine has been notoriously blind to the speech problems created by
copyright law.90 Intellectual property and the First Amendment “pull in opNo. 9815/82, 8 Eur. H.R. Rep. 407, ¶¶ 39–40 (1986) (holding that there must be a “‘pressing social need’” for the speech restriction, the reasons given must be “‘relevant and sufficient,’” and the
restriction must be proportionate to the aim pursued (internal citations omitted)).
81. Thorgeirson v. Iceland, App. No. 13778/88, 14 Eur. H.R. Rep. 843, 865 (1992).
82. Compulsory Membership in an Association Prescribed by Law for the Practice of Journalism (Arts. 13 and 29 American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-5/85,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 5, ¶ 46 (Nov. 13, 1985), available at
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/b_11_4e.htm.
83. See Gardbaum, supra note 70, at 397.
84. See Sullivan, supra note 3, at 295–96.
85. See id. at 295 (discussing how categorical and balancing approaches have oscillated in
First Amendment law).
86. Daniel A. Farber, The Categorical Approach to Protecting Speech in American Constitutional Law, 84 IND. L.J. 917, 918 (2009).
87. Id.
88. See Coenen, supra note 68, at 994 (“[S]ome forms of expression warrant neither total
immunization against nor total exposure to the threat of government-sponsored sanction.”).
89. See Joseph P. Bauer, Copyright and the First Amendment: Comrades, Combatants, or
Uneasy Allies, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 831, 833–35 (2010) (describing the conflict between the
Copyright Clause and the First Amendment as the threat of possible copyright infringement action, which may impermissibly deter free speech).
90. For criticisms of the U.S. approach to copyright law and free speech, see Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48
DUKE L.J. 147, 165–69 (1998) (describing the significance of Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v.
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posite directions.”91 As a speech restriction, copyright law “restricts [one]
from writing, painting, publicly performing, or otherwise communicating
what [one] please[s].”92
Rather than recognizing the speech implications of copyright law in
the two recent decisions of Eldred v. Ashcroft93 and Golan v. Holder,94 the
Supreme Court instead applied “only a mild form of rational basis review”
to copyright policy. As long as “Congress has not altered the traditional
contours of copyright protection,” copyright policy is effectively found to
be categorically immune from First Amendment scrutiny.95 Petitioners
urged the Court in Eldred to find that an extension of the copyright term
was unconstitutional under intermediate scrutiny, but the Court refused to
apply intermediate scrutiny to copyright policy to find the term extension
disproportionate.96 The Court also refused to review copyright policy under
a “congruence and proportionality” standard that it had established in cases
addressing Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.97
The First Amendment thus treats copyright policy with a strikingly
formalistic approach.98 The Court has held that copyright regulation is content-neutral and usually subject to a weak rational basis review, so it is not
scrutinized under the First Amendment.99 Functionally, Eldred and Golan
put most copyright regulations outside of First Amendment protection, as
though copyright questions were an unprotected category of speech.100

Nation Enterprises, and its effect on enjoining free speech); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating
Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1, 37–39 (2001) (explaining that
although the Constitution’s Copyright and Patent Clause explicitly empowers Congress to enact a
copyright statute, copyright is still vulnerable to First Amendment challenge); Jed Rubenfeld, The
Freedom of Imagination: Copyright’s Constitutionality, 112 YALE L.J. 1, 12–30 (2002) (commenting on the four principal explanations for copyright law’s insulation from First Amendment
review); and Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and
How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535, 553–55 (2004) (identifying other examples of speechprotective limits of copyright).
91. Bartholomew & Tehranian, supra note 66, at 3.
92. Lemley & Volokh, supra note 90, at 165–66.
93. 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
94. 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012).
95. Eldred, 537 at 221; see Bartholomew & Tehranian, supra note 66, at 10 (quoting Golan,
132 S. Ct. at 890–91).
96. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 199–208.
97. Id. at 217–18.
98. NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT’S PARADOX 170 (2010) (calling the intersection of First Amendment and copyright doctrine “judicial formalism at its worst”).
99. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 193–94; NETANEL, supra note 98, at 59 (rejecting the ad hoc balancing of social costs and benefits with regard to content-based regulations).
100. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 844; Eldred, 537 U.S. at 193–94.
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By contrast, foreign and transnational courts and institutions explicitly
weigh copyright laws against free expression rights.101 Multiple European
national courts have weighed copyright protection against the right of freedom of expression and information guaranteed in Article 10 of the
ECHR.102
In 2013, the ECHR held that copyright must be balanced against the
right to freedom of expression established in Article 10.103 The ECHR did
not perform a balancing test because it found that French judicial authorities
had done so properly.104 The ECHR explained that national courts will be
granted broad deference in balancing conflicting rights and interests, such
as the right to property and the right to free expression, especially where the
speech involved is commercial in nature.105 The court, however, recognized
the applicability of Article 10’s freedom of expression to a copyright
case.106 The ECHR explained that while freedom of expression is subject to
exceptions, any exception must be strictly interpreted and the reason for it
must be convincingly established.107
From an international perspective, two non-U.S. institutions have, using proportionality analysis, recently recognized that copyright enforcement
can impermissibly impinge on free speech. In 2009, the Constitutional
Council of the French Republic subjected the new French copyright en-

101. See Antoine Buyse, Copyright vs Freedom of Expression Judgment, ECHR BLOG (Jan.
22, 2013), http://echrblog.blogspot.in/2013/01/copyright-vs-freedom-of-expression.html (noting
that the European Court of Human Rights held that “a conviction or any other judicial decision
based on copyright law, restricting a person’s or an organisation’s freedom of expression, must be
pertinently motivated as being necessary in a democratic society, apart from being prescribed by
law and pursuing a legitimate aim”).
102. See id. (citing Plesner Joensen v. Louis Vuitton Malletier SA, [2011] E.C.D.R. 14
(Neth.)). In 1997, the Austrian Supreme Court explicitly acknowledged the conflict between copyright and free expression, under Article 10(2) of the ECHR. Oberster Gerichtshof [OGH] [Supreme Court] Dec. 1997, docket No. 4 Ob 361/97, 9 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES ÖSTERREICHISCHEN
OBERSTEN GERICHTSHOFES IN ZIVILSACHEN [SZ] (Austria), reprinted in 1998 GEWERBLICHER
RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT [GRUR] 896–98 (1998)(Ger.). In 2001, after the UK had
imported several sections of the ECHR into domestic law, the British Court of Appeal acknowledged that “rare circumstances can arise where the right of freedom of expression will come into
conflict with the protection afforded by the Copyright Act.” Ashdown v. Telegraph Group Ltd,
[2001] EWCA (Civ) 1142, [45] (Eng.).
103. Ashby Donald and Others v. France, App. No. 36769/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. (5th Section) at
¶40 (2013).
104. Id. ¶¶ 42, 43.
105. Id. ¶ 39 (noting the increased deference to lower courts when the speech is commercial
speech); id. ¶ 40 (noting that it is difficult to balance conflicting rights, and thus the margin of appreciation—the degree of deference to the domestic court—is important).
106. Id. ¶ 34 (recognizing the applicability of Article 10 to the copyrighted photographs at
issue).
107. Id. ¶ 38(i).
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forcement regime, the HADOPI, to constitutional review.108 The Council
held that the regime of graduated response, also known as three strikes,
must be subject to judicial oversight because it implicated users’ privacy
and speech rights. The French Parliament may lay down laws to reconcile
property with freedom of expression, but such laws must be proportionate
to their purpose.109 Furthermore, the Council found that in view of the
guarantee of freedom of expression and the proportionality requirement, the
French Parliament was not at liberty to vest its power in an administrative
authority outside of judicial review.110 The Court found that the proposed
legal process and burdens of proof were not adequately protective of the
free expression right.111
Similarly, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Frank La Rue, found that certain copyright enforcement policies disproportionately harm speech rights.112 The Special Rapporteur is appointed by the United Nations Secretary General to report and
advise on rights violations.113 In 2011, La Rue found that although expression “may be legitimately restricted under international human rights law,”
any restrictions, including copyright enforcement, must be subject to the
Article 19 three-part test.114 The report expressed alarm at “proposals to
disconnect users from Internet access if they violate intellectual property
rights.”115 Such proposals would violate Article 19’s proportionality requirement. The report also expressed concern over the Anti-Counterfeiting
Trade Agreement (“ACTA”), a copyright enforcement agreement.116 La
Rue remained “watchful about the treaty’s eventual implications for intermediary liability and the right to freedom of expression.”117

108. Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 2009-580DC, June 10,
2009,
Rec.
107
(Fr.),
available
at
http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseilconstitutionnel/francais/les-decisions/2009/decisions-par-date/2009/2009-580-dc/decision-n-2009580-dc-du-10-juin-2009.42666.html. English version available at http://www.conseilconstitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/root/bank/download/2009580DC2009_580dc.pdf.
109. Id. ¶ 15 (“Any restrictions placed on the exercising of such freedom must necessarily
be . . . proportionate to the purpose it is sought to achieve.”).
110. Id. ¶ 16.
111. Id. ¶¶ 17–19. A later review of the revised HADOPI laws, which involved a court system, found that due process had adequately been established and free speech rights were no longer
disproportionately violated. Id.
112. La Rue 2011, supra note 79.
113. Id.
114. Id. ¶ 24.
115. Id. ¶ 49.
116. Id. ¶ 50.
117. Id.
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There is thus a growing divide between the United States’ approach to
reconciling copyright and free expression, and the approach used by other
countries.118
III. FLAWS IN THE U.S. APPROACH
Focusing on the nature of the free speech regime instead of copyright’s
judicial exceptionalism illuminates a striking feature of the U.S. approach:
in the United States, once a category of speech falls outside of the First
Amendment’s protection, the legislature may apply any variety of sanctions, functionally unchecked by judicial scrutiny.119 The First Amendment
generally does not distinguish between civil and criminal liability, or between degrees of severity of sanctions for categorically unprotected
speech—it is a “penalty-neutral” approach.120
A proportionality analysis of speech, by contrast, is sensitive to whether a regulation is criminal or civil. In both 2011 and 2012, La Rue expressed deep concern over the criminalization of online expression.121 The
2011 Special Rapporteur’s report stated that “[i]mprisoning individuals for
seeking, receiving and imparting information and ideas can rarely be justified as a proportionate measure to achieve one of the legitimate aims under
article 19 [of the ICCPR].”122 Indeed, criminalization is problematic as an
enforcement method because a state’s restriction “must be proven as necessary and the least restrictive means required to achieve the purported
aim.”123
As a result, courts will always be more skeptical of the criminalization
of speech than of civil sanctions.124 Furthermore, the international intuition

118. This Article is not the first to observe that the United States and other countries approach
copyright differently. In attempting to explain the discrepancy between the U.S. and European
treatment of copyright and free speech, Birnhack focused on the different theoretical foundations
for copyright regimes in different countries, namely the United States internal approach, which
uses fair use and other doctrinal safety valves to reconcile free speech and copyright, and the European external approach, which weighs copyright against other values. Birnhack, supra note 7,
at 297. This Article focuses, instead, on the different features of applicable free speech regimes.
119. See Coenen, supra note 68, at 994 (discussing the “penalty-neutral” approach to free
speech adjudication in the United States, where speech is “either protected, in which case it may
not be punished, or unprotected, in which case it may be punished to a very great degree”); see
also Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471,
1517 (1998) (observing that the First Amendment does not generally “impose[] limits on the severity of punishment for speech that the government is entitled to criminalize”).
120. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
121. La Rue 2012, supra note 73, ¶ 64; La Rue 2011, supra note 79, ¶ 34.
122. La Rue 2011, supra note 79, ¶ 36.
123. Id. ¶ 69.
124. Id.
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is that human rights law protects the “vertical relationships” between the
state and individuals more strongly than private “horizontal relationships”
between individuals.125 Thus, criminalization of speech is particularly suspect because it directly involves the enforcement power of the state against
the individual. Criminalization also invokes the powerful stigma of official
state disapproval, which is far stronger in criminal law than, for example, a
system of agency-administered fines.
The U.S. approach to the First Amendment does not take into account
differences between criminal and civil sanctions.126 This feature of First
Amendment doctrine has remained relatively overlooked because the Court
often throws out civil speech laws and, thus, has not needed to consider explicitly whether criminal speech sanctions are more problematic than civil
ones.127
In the United States, most speech regulation is not permissible even in
the civil context.128 As a consequence, First Amendment doctrine, unlike
international freedom of expression, fails to decry the criminalization of
speech as disproportionate to all but the most serious government aims. 129
While states within the United States have repealed their criminal libel
laws, no clear First Amendment rule tells states they cannot criminalize libel if they define it in line with the definitions sanctioned in First Amendment case law.130
In fact, the Supreme Court, in dicta, has made observations that equate
criminal and civil sanctions.131 The Court observed that “the [f]ear of damage awards . . . may be markedly more inhibiting than the fear of prosecution under a criminal statute.”132 Some forms of civil regulation can create
“hazards to protected freedoms markedly greater than those that attend reli-

125. P. Bernt Hugenholtz, Copyright and Freedom of Expression in Europe, in THE
COMMODIFICATION OF INFORMATION 247–48 (Niva Elkin-Koren & Neil Weinstock Netanel eds.,
2002); Affaire Tolstoy Miloslavsky C. Royaume-Uni [Tolstoy Miloslavsky v. United Kingdom],
20 Eur. H.R. Rep. 442 (1996).
126. See Coenen, supra note 68, at 994–96 (explaining that “the standard method of First
Amendment analysis is penalty-neutral” and, when the Court “has flirted with penalty-sensitive
review, [it] has proceeded in an ad hoc manner”).
127. See id. at 994 (describing First Amendment litigation as a “winner-take-all affair”).
128. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (reviewing the case
“against the background of a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public
issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open”).
129. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
130. Eugene Volokh, One-to-One Speech vs. One-to-Many Speech, Criminal Harassment
Laws, and “Cyberstalking,” 107 NW. U. L. REV. 731, 751–53 (2013).
131. New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 277–78.
132. Id. at 277.
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ance upon the criminal law.”133 The Court then concluded that “[w]hat a
State may not constitutionally bring about by means of a criminal statute is
likewise beyond the reach of its civil law of libel,” effectively equating civil
and criminal liability.134
Despite this statement of equivalence, the Court has struggled with an
intuition that criminal prosecution is more problematic than civil sanctions.135 This discomfort is an instance of the doctrinal instability created
by the First Amendment’s categorical approach.136 In one case, the Court
observed that “a law imposing criminal penalties on protected speech is a
stark example of speech suppression.”137 In another case, the Court clarified that a First Amendment holding permitting administrative sanctions of
speech might not extend to criminal prosecutions.138 The Court also noted
its “greater tolerance of enactments with civil rather than criminal penalties.”139 Further, the Court has reasoned that when a case did not involve a
criminal statute, the consequences of its decision were “not constitutionally
severe.”140
The Supreme Court came closest to recognizing that criminal sanctions might be more problematic than civil sanctions in Reno v. American
Civil Liberties Union.141 In Reno, Justice Stevens stated several times that
criminal sanctions are more troubling than civil sanctions.142 Concluding
that the statute at hand was not narrowly tailored, the Court explained that
“the risk of criminal sanctions ʽhovers over each content provider, like the
proverbial sword of Damocles.ʼ”143 Criminal statutes are problematic because of the harsh penalties they carry, as well as the social stigma that ac133. Id. at 278 (quoting Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963)).
134. Id. at 277. The civil libel law at issue had produced damages that were one thousand
times the maximum fine under a comparable criminal statute, and the Court pointed out that
“criminal-law safeguards,” such as an indictment, proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and double
jeopardy, would not be available to a defendant in a civil action. Id. at 277–78.
135. See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (stating that “criminal prosecution
under a statute regulating expression usually involves imponderables and contingencies that themselves may inhibit the full exercise of First Amendment freedoms”).
136. Id.
137. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 244 (2002).
138. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 750 (1978) (explaining that the Court had “not
decided . . . that this broadcast would justify a criminal prosecution”).
139. Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498–99
(1982).
140. Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 589 (1998).
141. 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (holding that full First Amendment protection extends to speech on
the Internet).
142. Id. at 872.
143. Id. at 882 (quoting ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 855–56 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff’d, 521
U.S. 844 (1997)).
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companies a criminal conviction.144 The severity of punishment creates an
“increased deterrent effect” that, “coupled with the ‘risk of discriminatory
enforcement’ of vague regulations, poses greater First Amendment concerns than those implicated by . . . civil regulation.”145 This language, however, seems to be in direct tension with the Court’s language from New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan146 equating civil sanctions of speech with criminal sanctions.147
The lack of a clear rule disfavoring the criminalization of speech is a
perversity of the United States’ deviation from proportionality analysis.
Because speech is categorically either in or out of the First Amendment’s
protection, the Court rarely reaches whether the sanctions themselves are
appropriate.148 The only specific sanction that receives close First Amendment scrutiny is the use of prior restraints.149 Notably, even prior restraints
are not scrutinized in the copyright enforcement context.150
A. Judicial Abdication and the Political Economy of Intellectual
Property
The First Amendment thus does not distinguish between criminal and
civil liability once a category of speech is outside of its protection.151 Copyright policy functionally has been found to be outside the scope of First
Amendment protection, subject only to weak rational basis review unless
Congress tampers with the First Amendment “safety valves” of fair use or
the idea-expression dichotomy.152 Because most copyright policy is effectively outside of First Amendment scrutiny, the U.S. legislature has been

144. Id. at 872 (“In addition to the opprobrium and stigma of a criminal conviction, the
[Communications Decency Act of 1996] threatens violators with penalties including up to two
years in prison for each act of violation.”).
145. Id. (citing Denver Area Ed. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996)).
146. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
147. Id. at 277–78.
148. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
149. Lemley & Volokh, supra note 90, at 169–70. “Prior restraints” are defined as “preliminary injunctions, not permanent injunctions.” Id. at 169 (emphasis omitted).
150. Id. at 174–75.
151. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
152. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 218–21 (2003) (finding that copyright can be reconciled with the First Amendment and thus subjected only to rational basis review because it contains the internal safety valves of idea-expression dichotomy and fair use doctrine; because it was
enacted close-in-time with the First Amendment; and because copyright is the “engine of free expression”).
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able to ratchet up speech-restricting copyright enforcement measures unchecked by judiciary review.153
Tiered review can permit judicial abdication to the legislature.154 This
claim may be counterintuitive to those who see proportionality analysis as
deferential, and tiered review as more protective. By leaving copyright policy outside of judicial scrutiny, however, the Court defers to Congress on
the statutory details of copyright law.155 This deference is a consequence of
a First Amendment system that regularly allows for only all-or-nothing review.156 If the Court had decided to subject copyright to more than rational
basis review, it might have found itself regularly deciding many parameters
of copyright policy.157 Instead, by functionally placing copyright outside of
the First Amendment, the Court left all speech-related details for Congress
to decide.158
In Eldred, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of the
Copyright Term Extension Act. Rather than examining whether the increased copyright term was disproportionately restrictive of freedom of expression, the Court explicitly deferred to Congress, explaining that “it is
generally for Congress, not the courts, to decide how best to pursue the
Copyright Clause’s objectives.”159 When the Court in Golan considered
whether Congress could take works out of the public domain and reinstate
copyright protection, the Court reiterated that Congress may do what it
wants with copyright policy, as long as it does not alter the “traditional con153. See id. at 204–08 (stating that the Court is “not at liberty to second-guess congressional
determinations and policy judgments of this order, however debatable or arguably unwise they
may be”).
154. Mathews & Sweet, supra note 18, at 838.
155. These statutory details of copyright law are referred to in the literature as “policy levers.”
See Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of Reverse Engineering,
111 YALE L.J. 1575, 1649 (2002) (noting that “[a]ll intellectual property rights regimes . . . have
certain policy levers in common, wielded to a greater or lesser extent”). Bartholomew and Tehranian suggest that copyright’s lack of deference to the First Amendment partially may be because
copyright is mainly statutorily dictated. See Bartholomew & Tehranian, supra note 66, at 71–78,
90 (explaining that statutes can close off “avenues for addressing expressive concerns”); see also
Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Pragmatic Incrementalism of Common Law Intellectual Property,
63 VAND. L. REV. 1543, 1578 (2010) (noting that common law is more adaptable because it uses
standards instead of rules).
156. See Bartholomew & Tehranian, supra note 66, at 72 (observing that “judges operating
within the freedom of the common law appear better able to preserve a broad theoretical landscape, whereas statutory analysis restricts judicial autonomy”); Balganesh, supra note 155, at
1578 (noting that courts have greater discretion when dealing with standards as opposed to rules).
157. See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429–31 (1984) (stating that
Congress has the “institutional ability to accommodate fully the varied permutations of competing
interests that are inevitably implicated by . . . new technology”).
158. Id.
159. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 (2003).
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tours” of copyright protection and impinge on fair use or the ideaexpression dichotomy.160
The consequence of judicial deference to Congress’s choices on copyright policy details is that the political economy of copyright lawmaking
remains unchecked by the judiciary in the United States.161 Unchecked
copyright law-making tends to disproportionately protect rights holders at
the expense of second-generation users and authors.162
Political economists explain the stunning recent expansion of U.S.
copyright law through “public choice” theory.163 Intellectual property creators and owners, which are often large corporations, receive high economic
rents through copyright protection.164 But copiers, who are often dispersed
individuals, receive only a competitive advantage.165 The costs of organization are thus higher and the benefits of organization lower for those protecting the public domain than for those desiring more copyright protection.166
Without checks from the judiciary, this has resulted in an upward ratchet of
statutory growth.167
Criminal copyright law and enforcement measures, while infrequently
discussed, are particularly problematic examples of U.S. copyright expansion, from a free speech perspective. The United States criminalizes low
levels of copyright infringement, and employs speech-threatening enforcement mechanisms, including the seizure of websites. The United States
has, in recent years, attempted to export its criminal standard and enforcement measures worldwide.168 In addition, the United States has recently at-

160. Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 890 (2012) (“We then described the ‘traditional contours’ of copyright protection, i.e., the ‘idea/expression dichotomy’ and the ‘fair use’ defense.”).
161. Lemley & Volokh, supra note 90, at 174–75.
162. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 1–5 (2004) (tracing the expansion of intellectual property protection,
specifically focusing on the scope of copyright law).
163. Id. at 10–13, 16–17.
164. Id. at 14–15.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 14–15.
167. But see Amy Kapczynski, The Access to Knowledge Mobilization and the New Politics of
Intellectual Property, 117 YALE L.J. 804, 808 (2008) (“The public choice accounts developed in
IP scholarship to explain the strengthening of IP law over the last thirty years suggest that such a
countermobilization is highly unlikely, or even impossible. How, then, can we account for the
new A2K mobilization and its apparent successes?”).
168. See generally Margot E. Kaminski, An Overview and the Evolution of the AntiCounterfeiting Trade Agreement, 21 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 385 (2011) (arguing that ACTA was
developed to maximize international intellectual property standards, without opportunity for fair
negotiations amongst all interested countries); Susan K. Sell, The Global IP Upward Ratchet, Anti–Counterfeiting and Piracy Enforcement Efforts: The State of Play (June 9, 2008),
http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/intellectual_property/development.research/SusanSellfinalversio
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tempted to apply its criminal enforcement across borders to citizens of other
countries—where infringement is not similarly criminalized—resulting in
several recent extradition cases.169
Criminal copyright law was first enacted in the United States in
1897.170 For the next century, the underlying distinction between civil and
criminal copyright law was that criminal law punished commercial-level
infringement, while civil law punished individual infringement for noncommercial purposes.171 In 1997, the No Electronic Theft Act (“NET
Act”)172 altered this distinction.173 Under the NET Act, an infringer no
longer requires a commercial motive and need not infringe at a commercially significant level to be found criminally liable for copyright infringement
in the United States.174
The current criminal copyright standard is two-pronged: one prong
targets infringement of any amount if done for private financial gain; and
the second punishes infringement over a certain threshold amount, when
done willfully but without a requirement of financial or commercial motive.175 The first prong of the statute, which requires a financial motive but
no threshold amount of infringement, may at first seem to trace past legal
requirements that infringement be of a commercial nature.176 It is, however,
a lower hurdle. The financial motive in the first prong need not require a
n.pdf (arguing that the United States exerts a strong influence on international IP framework development in its quest for higher global IP standards).
169. See, e.g., Complaint, United States v. O’Dwyer, No. 10 Mag. 2471 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 5,
2010), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/100259020/U-S-v-O-Dwyer-SDNY-1-SealedComplaint. In the Complaint, a citizen of the United Kingdom, Richard O’Dwyer, was charged
with conspiracy to commit copyright infringement and criminal copyright infringement for owning and operating TVShack.net and TVShack.cc. See id. ¶¶ 1–4. As a result, the United States
successfully obtained an extradition order in British courts to bring O’Dwyer to the United States
for trial; however, the case settled. Richard O’Dwyer ‘Happy’ U.S. Copyright Case Is Over, BBC
NEWS (DEC. 6, 2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-20636626.
170. Act of Jan. 6, 1897, ch. 4, 29 Stat. 481.
171. See, e.g., Geraldine Szott Moohr, The Crime of Copyright Infringement: An Inquiry
Based on Morality, Harm, and Criminal Theory, 83 B.U. L. REV. 731, 735–36 (2003) (distinguishing between civil and criminal provisions in copyright law); Note, The Criminalization of
Copyright Infringement in the Digital Era, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1705, 1706–07 (1999) [hereinafter
Note] (explaining that the 1897 Act “introduced the paradigm of differentiating criminal from civil copyright violations based upon whether the infringement was pursued for purposes of commercial exploitation”).
172. No Electronic Theft Act (NET), Pub. L. No. 105-147, 111 Stat. 2678 (1997).
173. The NET Act was prompted by United States v. LaMacchia, in which the United States
District Court for the District of Massachusetts found that copyright infringement lacking a commercial motive could not be prosecuted under criminal law. 871 F. Supp. 535, 544–45 (D. Mass.
1994).
174. No Electronic Theft Act § 2(a).
175. Id.; 17 U.S.C. § 506(a)(2) (2010).
176. 17 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1) (2010).

610

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 73:587

sale; it is satisfied by the “receipt, or expectation of receipt, of anything of
value, including the receipt of other copyrighted works.”177 Thus, in order
to criminally infringe copyright under the statute, a user need only expect to
receive something of value, including other copyrighted works.178 This definition targets file sharing of any amount.
Both prongs of current U.S. criminal copyright law sweep into realms
traditionally occupied by civil copyright law.179 The first prong’s “financial
motive” targets all intentional exchanges of infringing works, even where a
user receives only one work from another user.180 The second prong’s low
statutory threshold ($1,000 of infringement in a 180-day period, regardless
of motive) threatens to criminalize routine infringement that has been seen
as personal use or fair use, such as photocopying books for educational purposes.181 Moreover, prosecutors have indicated that they are willing to
prosecute excerpting.182 Fair use is a defense to criminal copyright infringement, but the statutory definitions of the two criminal infringement
offenses may restrict the scope of findings of what constitutes fair use.183
The current international standard for criminal copyright resembles an
earlier stage of U.S. law. The international standard established in the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(“TRIPS”) requires criminalization of copyright infringement only when it
is “willful” and done on a “commercial scale.”184
Id. § 101 (defining the term “financial gain”).
Id. § 506(a)(1).
Moohr, supra note 171, at 739.
U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, COMPUTER CRIME AND INTELLECTUAL PROP. SECTION, CRIM. DIV.,
PROSECUTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CRIMES 54 (3d ed. 2006) [hereinafter PROSECUTING
MANUAL] (“For example, federal prosecutors have successfully charged ‘commercial advantage
or private financial gain’ in cases where defendants ran a closed peer-to-peer file-trading network
that required new users to contribute pirated material in order to join.”).
181. Lydia Pallas Loren, Digitization, Commodification, Criminalization: The Evolution of
Criminal Copyright Infringement and the Importance of the Willfulness Requirement, 77 WASH.
U. L. Q. 835, 868–69 (1999).
182. See PROSECUTING MANUAL, supra note 180, at 38 (discussing potential prosecution for
reproduction of partial portions of a work).
183. Fair use analysis is statutorily defined and consists of four prongs: the purpose and character of the work, the nature of the copied work, the amount and substantiality of the copying, and
the effect on the work’s value. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2010). These low standards potentially restrict
court findings of fair use in cases of infringement over $ 1,000, and when somebody has exchanged one work for another. See, e.g., Loren, supra note 181, at 869 (pointing out that determining “criminal copyright infringement” will be difficult “when the defendant’s use is not motivated by commercial advantage or private financial gain”). The statutory definitions of criminal
copyright infringement appear to map onto behavior that has traditionally been deemed fair use.
Id.
184. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 61, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869
177.
178.
179.
180.
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The United States and China recently disputed the meaning of “commercial scale.”185 The United States proposed that “commercial scale” must
encompass the activities of both those engaging in activities for a “financial
return,” no matter how small their operations, and those who infringe at a
“sufficient extent or magnitude,” regardless of motive.186 This proposal noticeably attempted to read the international standard to reflect current U.S.
criminal copyright law. A World Trade Organization (“WTO”) Dispute
Settlement Panel rejected the U.S. argument that criminal copyright covers
all infringement except for de minimis use,187 and refused to provide a definition of “commercial scale.” Instead, the WTO Dispute Settlement Panel
found that the United States provided insufficient evidence to demonstrate
what “commercial scale” meant “in the specific situation of China’s marketplace.”188 The panel also refused to reach whether “commercial scale”
requires that states criminalize infringement over a certain amount, done
without a for-profit motive. Thus the panel confirmed that United States
criminal copyright law goes beyond the international requirement that states
criminalize commercial scale infringement. Instead of criminalizing only
commercial scale infringement, the U.S. definition criminalizes noncommercial personal use infringement.189

U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement] (“Members shall provide for criminal procedures and penalties to be applied at least in cases of wilful trademark counterfeiting or
copyright piracy on a commercial scale. Remedies available shall include imprisonment and/or
monetary fines sufficient to provide a deterrent, consistently with the level of penalties applied for
crimes of a corresponding gravity. In appropriate cases, remedies available shall also include the
seizure, forfeiture and destruction of the infringing goods and of any materials and implements the
predominant use of which has been in the commission of the offence. Members may provide for
criminal procedures and penalties to be applied in other cases of infringement of intellectual property rights, in particular where they are committed wilfully and on a commercial scale.”).
185. See generally Report of the Panel, China—Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, WT/DS362/R (Jan. 26, 2009) [hereinafter China IP
Panel Report] (discussing the thresholds for which the United States claims “China has not provided for criminal procedures and penalties to be applied in cases of wilful trademark counterfeiting or copyright piracy on a commercial scale”); see also Miriam Bitton, Rethinking the AntiCounterfeiting Trade Agreement’s Criminal Copyright Enforcement Measures, 102 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 67, 71–72 (2012) (noting the rapid pace at which “[c]riminal law has been embedding itself into intellectual property law,” as well as “difficulty and opposition” resulting from the
“unique characteristics of intellectual properties”); Peter K. Yu, The TRIPS Enforcement Dispute,
89 NEB. L. REV. 1046, 1056 (2011) (citing TRIPS Agreement art. 61).
186. China IP Panel Report, supra note 185, at § 7.480.
187. Id. at § 7.551–7.553.
188. Id. at § 7.614.
189. See Irina D. Manta, The Puzzle of Criminal Sanctions for Intellectual Property Infringement, 24 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 469, 516 (2011) (referring to the current criminalization standard in
copyright law as reaching “non-commercial copyright infringement”); Moohr, supra note 11, at
800 (referring to the NET Act as targeting personal use infringement).
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Numerous scholars have criticized the expansion of U.S. criminal copyright law, exploring its lack of moral underpinnings.190 They have argued
that the costs are too high and benefits too uncertain.191 They have criticized the expansion as a psychologically ineffective enforcement tactic.192
They have even criticized the criminal copyright standard under the Copyright Clause, concluding that overly broad copyright criminalization undermines the constitutional purpose of copyright law.193
B. Speech Problems with Criminal Copyright
Although numerous scholars have noted that criminal copyright raises
speech problems, these problems have not been discussed at length.194 Perhaps the lack of scholarly analysis has been due to under enforcement of the
NET Act.195 In 2008, however, Congress enacted the Priority Resources
and Organization for Intellectual Property Act (“PRO-IP Act”) to increase

190. STUART P. GREEN, THIRTEEN WAYS TO STEAL A BICYCLE: THEFT LAW IN THE
INFORMATION AGE 253–57 (2012) (concluding copyright offenders are not “sufficiently culpable
to justify criminalization”); Bitton, supra note 185, at 72; Moohr, supra note 171, at 735; see also
Stuart P. Green, Moral Ambiguity in White Collar Criminal Law, 18 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS &
PUB. POL’Y 501, 510 (2004) (discussing white-collar crimes and the difficulties of identifying
both harms and victims).
191. Moohr, supra note 11, at 807–08.
192. See Tom R. Tyler, Compliance with Intellectual Property Laws: A Psychological Perspective, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 219, 224–25 (1997).
193. See Note, supra note 171, at 1718 (“The mere threat of criminal penalties could chill the
very activities that the Copyright Clause is intended to promote.”); see generally Diane L. Kilpatrick-Lee, Criminal Copyright Law: Preventing a Clear Danger to the U.S. Economy or Clearly
Preventing the Original Purpose of Copyright Law?, 14 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 87, 118
(2005) (concluding that the evolution of copyright law and the punishments go beyond its original
purpose and what is necessary to deter infringement).
194. See, e.g., I. Trotter Hardy, Criminal Copyright Infringement, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS.
J. 305, 306 (2002) (explaining that criminal copyright is perceived by the general public as restricting free speech and other paramount rights); Bitton, supra note 185, at 83 (“Criminalizing
copyright law also implicates First Amendment rights.”); Loren, supra note 181, at 861 (noting
that copyright policy implicates “special concerns” that include “the inherent tension with the values embodied in the First Amendment that are present when people are given a monopoly over
expressive works”); Manta, supra note 189, at 516 (explaining that criminal copyright might pose
a particularly difficult problem because of the “possible chilling effect on expressive activities”);
Moohr, supra note 11, at 789 n.14 (noting that “the First Amendment also plays a role in copyright doctrine, preventing the rights granted to authors from restricting the public’s right to free
speech”); Note, supra note 171, at 1718 (“The mere threat of criminal penalties could chill the
very activities that the Copyright Clause is intended to promote.”).
195. See Eric Goldman, A Road to No Warez: The No Electronic Theft Act and Criminal Copyright Infringement, 82 OR. L. REV. 369, 377 (2003) (noting that no convictions were made during
the first eighteen months after the NET Act’s enactment).
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criminal enforcement, and the speech problems have since become more
apparent, prompting further academic discussion.196
Since the PRO-IP Act, criminal copyright enforcement efforts both inside and outside of the United States have increased. It can be difficult to
ascertain precise numbers, because the government combines its assessment
of copyright enforcement with other kinds of intellectual property (“IP”) enforcement in its data collection.
The U.S. government, however, has highlighted its general increase in
IP enforcement since the PRO-IP Act.197 Since 2009, United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) and Homeland Security Investigations (“HIS”) of IP-related cases are up 71%, arrests are up 159%, and
convictions are up 103%.198 The FBI has increased IP-related arrests by
68% since 2010.199 In each year since 2009, Assistant United States Attorneys have charged approximately 170 criminal IP cases, representing a 14%
increase in the number of defendants charged per year prior to 2009.200 Of
the 202 IP defendants sentenced in 2012, over half received prison terms,
with over 40 defendants receiving sentences of longer than one year in prison.201 International cooperation between national law enforcement agencies
has also increased, as U.S. agencies cooperate with agencies in Canada,
Mexico, and international bodies, such as INTERPOL.202 The United States
has highlighted several extradition efforts related to copyright crimes.203
In addition to building enforcement infrastructure, the PRO-IP Act
created new civil and criminal forfeiture provisions.204 The United States

196. PROTECT IP Act of 2011, S. 968, 112th Cong § 4 (2011); Grace Pyun, The 2008 PROIP Act: The Inadequacy of the Property Paradigm in Criminal Intellectual Property Law and Its
Effect on Prosecutorial Boundaries, 19 DEPAUL J. ART TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 355, 377–78
(2009). See generally Christopher J. Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur, Innovation and Incarceration: An Economic Analysis of Criminal Intellectual Property Law 1–4 (University of Chicago
Coase-Sandor Inst. for Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 649, 2013), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2297488 (discussing the scope and enforcement of IP laws and their expansion in the use of criminal sanctions to deter IP violations).
197. See, e.g., U.S. INTELL. PROP. ENFORCEMENT COORDINATOR, 2013 JOINT STRATEGIC
PLAN ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT 1 (2013) [hereinafter 2013 Joint Strategic
Plan].
198. Id.
199. Id. at 21.
200. Id. at 21, 44. See also Ryan Rufo, Below the Surface of the ACTA: The Dangers That
Justify New Criminal Sanctions Against Intellectual Property Infringement, 39 AIPLA Q.J. 511,
530 (2011) (describing a report estimating that “17.53% of total Internet traffic in the United
States infringed intellectual property rights”).
201. 2013 Joint Strategic Plan, supra note 197, at 44.
202. Id. at 25.
203. Id. at 26, 30.
204. Pyun, supra note 196, at 356.
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has been using these provisions, founded on its underlying standard for
criminal copyright law, to seize and forfeit websites ex parte, and without
subsequently going to trial.205 Operation in Our Sites, a coordinated effort
between multiple U.S. law enforcement agencies, resulted in the government seizure of more than 1,700 website domain names since 2010 and the
seizure of substantial monetary assets.206 Project Fake Sweep, nominally a
trademark enforcement operation, has also seized over 300 websites engaged in distributing allegedly pirated copyrighted works.207
There are at least five distinct speech problems with enforcing a standard for criminal copyright infringement that extends broadly enough to include noncommercial personal use. The first is a First Amendment due
process problem: there is no protection from prior restraints in copyright
law and, therefore, the government can use and has used criminal copyright
procedures to take speech down ex parte and before trial.208 The second is a
collateral censorship problem: when governments go after the intermediaries, as the United States has through criminal copyright enforcement, intermediaries often become overcautious and censor user speech.209 Third,
overcriminalization pushes intermediaries into private ordering out of fear
of enforcement, which promotes privatized censorship and reduces transparency.210 Fourth, criminalizing low-level infringement impinges on an
Internet user’s right to receive information.211 And fifth, a low criminal
standard permits arbitrary enforcement, which can be used to punish other
205. Mike Masnick, Website Censored by Feds Takes Up Lamar Smith’s Challenge: Here’s
Your
‘Hypothetical,’
TECHDIRT
(Jan.
10,
2012),
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20120110/11395317367/website-censored-feds-takes-up-lamarsmiths-challenge-heres-your-hypothetical.shtml. Most famously, the United States charged Kim
Dotcom and his associates with both direct criminal copyright infringement and accomplice liability, and forfeited their domain names. See Drew Olanoff, Here’s the Full 72 Page Megaupload
DOJ
Indictment,
THENEXTWEB
(Jan.
20,
2012,
12:12
AM),
http://thenextweb.com/insider/2012/01/20/heres-the-full-72-page-megaupload-doj-indictment/.
The U.K. citizen Richard O’Dwyer was also charged with both conspiracy to commit copyright
infringement, and criminal copyright infringement, for owning and operating TVShack.net and
TVShack.cc. Both domain names were seized. See supra note 169.
206. 2013 Joint Strategic Plan, supra note 197, at 20.
207. Id. at 65.
208. Lemley & Volokh, supra note 90, at 158–65; Rubenfeld, supra note 90, at 3. Although it
has not yet had an opportunity to consider the constitutionality of civil in rem forfeiture, the Court
has been careful to distinguish between criminal and civil forfeiture proceedings. See Alexander
v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 553–54 (1993) (explaining that the criminal forfeiture provision at
issue was after trial, and therefore not a prior restraint); Id. at 559 (Souter, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (distinguishing that this case concerned criminal forfeiture, not civil forfeiture).
209. See infra note 219 and accompanying text.
210. Derek Bambauer, Orwell’s Armchair, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 863, 867–68 (2012).
211. See infra note 228 and accompanying text.
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kinds of speech the government does not like, and can cause chilling effects.212
The combination of a low underlying criminal copyright standard and
a lack of First Amendment scrutiny allows the government to employ criminal procedures that, when applied to speech, resemble prior restraints.213 In
the name of criminal copyright enforcement, the United States has used preindictment seizures to seize the domain names of websites prior to trial.214
The low standard of criminal infringement eases the probable cause requirement, providing low hurdles for the government’s ability to obtain a
warrant to seize an entire website domain.215
Seizing an entire site implicates the speech rights of more than the accused; it also censors all other users who speak through the website, regardless of whether they are copyright infringers.216 The tool of civil asset forfeiture, created by the PRO-IP Act of 2008, does not even require probable
cause.217 Civil asset forfeiture is problematic, but it may be less significant
than critics have deemed in this area because of how easy it is to show
probable cause of low-level criminal infringement and thus obtain a preindictment seizure warrant.
The second speech problem raised by the low criminal copyright
standard is collateral censorship.218 How liable websites are for criminal
copyright infringement that occurs through them is unclear. Even if prior
restraint problems are solved, an overly broad criminal standard still creates
a specter of criminal liability for an intermediary for de minimis behavior or
even accidental behavior. The specter of criminal liability encourages col212. See infra note 231 and accompanying text.
213. Timothy B. Lee, How the Criminalization of Copyright Threatens Innovation and the
Rule of Law, in COPYRIGHT UNBALANCED: FROM INCENTIVE TO EXCESS 55, 55–74 (Jerry Brito
ed., 2012).
214. See, e.g., Mike Masnick, Breaking News: Feds Falsely Censor Popular Blog for over a
Year, Deny All Due Process, Hide All Details . . ., TECHDIRT (Dec. 8, 2011, 8:29 AM),
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20111208/08225217010/breaking-news-feds-falsely-censorpopular-blog-over-year-deny-all-due-process-hide-all-details.shtml (discussing a pre-indictment
seizure of a website domain for over a year before trial).
215. See Mike Masnick, Feds Tie Themselves in Legal Knots Arguing for Domain Forfeiture
in
Rojadirecta
Case,
TECHDIRT
(May
16,
2012,
10:22
AM),
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20120516/05031118941/feds-tie-themselves-legal-knotsarguing-domain-forfeiture-rojadirecta-case.shtml (arguing that the government “could easily seize
and forfeit any search engine domain or any website that allows public comments, merely by asserting that a link in a search result or a link in a comment led to infringing material”).
216. Christina Mulligan, Technological Intermediaries and Freedom of the Press, 66 SMU L.
REV. 101, 120–21 (2013).
217. Pyun, supra note 196, at 387.
218. See Michael I. Meyerson, Authors, Editors, and Uncommon Carriers: Identifying the
“Speaker” with the New Media, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 79, 116 (1995); see also J.M. Balkin,
Free Speech and Hostile Environments, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2295, 2298 (1999).
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lateral censorship by the intermediary against the user.219 Intermediaries are
not invested in content in the same way users are, so a fear of criminal liability can cause intermediaries to take down user material out of an excess
of caution. Criminal copyright liability is a real threat for online intermediaries: the U.S. government has charged online intermediaries with both direct criminal infringement and aiding and abetting criminal infringement.220
The third speech problem is related: threatening to charge online intermediaries with criminal infringement, whether direct or secondary, can
push them into more opaque private ordering regimes with less due process
for Internet users. This scenario arises out of the same natural caution that
causes collateral censorship. If an online intermediary fears criminal enforcement, one thing it can do to protect itself is to make a bargain with
content owners to show good intent. The PRO-IP Act established a system
wherein content owners consult with the Department of Justice about bad
actors.221 In the United States, content owners and Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”) have entered into a bargain, with encouragement from the U.S.
IP Enforcement Coordinator: the copyright alert system. The copyright
alert system is a private agreement, in which ISPs promise to slow down Internet speeds if copyright infringement is found.222 Privately ordered regulation such as this is problematic because citizens have trouble identifying
and protesting it, and thereby engaging in the process of governance.
The fourth speech problem raised by the overcriminalization of copyright infringement is that it impinges on the Internet user’s right to receive
information, recognized in both international and U.S. law. The Supreme
Court noted that “the Constitution protects the right to receive information

219. United States courts have also recognized the problem of collateral censorship, although
without calling it by that name. The 1959 case of Farmers Educational and Cooperative Union v.
WDAY, 360 U.S. 525 (1959), beautifully outlines the problem. In the context of the FCC’s mustcarry rules, a local radio station could not take down a candidate’s speech just because they judged
it to be libelous. That station, however, also could not be held liable for libel. The court stated:
Quite possibly, if a station were held responsible for the broadcast of libelous material,
all remarks even faintly objectionable would be excluded out of an excess of caution.
Moreover, if any censorship were permissible, a station so inclined could intentionally
inhibit a candidate’s legitimate presentation under the guise of lawful censorship of libelous matter.
Id. at 530.
220. See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
221. See Priority Resources and Organization for Intellectual Property Act of 2008, Pub. L.
110-403, 122 Stat. 4256 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 8101 et seq. (2012)), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-110publ403/pdf/PLAW-110publ403.pdf.
222. See Lisa Richwine, Internet Providers to Act Against Online Pirates, REUTERS, July 7,
2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/07/us-internet-piracy-idUSTRE7667FL20110707
(reporting that certain U.S. ISPs will post warning messages and throttle internet speeds should
they discover their customers illegally downloading copyrighted films).
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and ideas.”223 This right “is fundamental to our free society.”224 The right
to receive information is linked to a right to personal intellectual breathing
space,225 and “the right to be free from state inquiry into the contents of
[one’s] library.”226 Copyright enforcement involves examining the contents
of one’s library.227 Criminalizing a de minimis level of infringement, with a
low showing of intent, allows the state—in addition to private actors—to
partake in the examination of any content a user might have.228 Such criminal copyright infringement often appears in proposed U.S. laws as a justification for state surveillance or network management.229 The U.S. network
neutrality provisions contain carve-outs for monitoring and managing illegal content, explicitly including copyright infringing material.230
Finally, overcriminalization gives rise to the problem of arbitrary enforcement. Arbitrary enforcement chills speech; this reasoning is often
used to justify the First Amendment’s overbreadth and vagueness doctrines.
A vague statute “delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and
juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant
dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application.”231 Broad criminalization has the same practical consequences: if everybody is a criminal, the
state can choose whom to prosecute at will. This discretion allows states to
prosecute citizens for copyright infringement as punishment for other behavior or speech that they cannot otherwise prosecute.
In Russia, for example, the government has arrested a series of noted
dissidents not for political speech but ostensibly for copyright infringe223. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969).
224. Id.
225. Rubenfeld, supra note 90, at 24–25, 28.
226. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 565.
227. See Lemley & Volokh, supra note 90, at 166 (observing that copyright law “seriously
restricts speakers’ ability to express themselves the way they want” and therefore should be subject to First Amendment scrutiny).
228. See generally Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at “Copyright Management” in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 981, 981 (1996) (discussing “digital monitoring of individual reading habits for purposes of so-called ‘copyright management’ in cyberspace”); see also Paul Ohm, The Rise and Fall of Invasive ISP Surveillance, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV.
1417, 1452 (2009) (discussing the proper balance between ISP surveillance and user privacy).
229. Emil Protalinski, After Denouncing SOPA and PIPA, How Can Facebook Support
CISPA?, ZDNET (Apr. 12, 2010, 8:07 AM), http://www.zdnet.com/blog/facebook/afterdenouncing-sopa-and-pipa-how-can-facebook-support-cispa/11700 (“CISPA also includes portions about protecting intellectual property . . . If an IP thief is considered a threat to cyber security, then his website, or where he posted the content, could technically be blocked by CISPA.”).
230. Open Internet, FCC, http://www.fcc.gov/openinternet (last visited Jan. 17, 2014)
(“[N]othing in the rules prohibits reasonable efforts by a broadband provider to address copyright
infringement or other unlawful activity.”).
231. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108–09 (1972) (noting that an overly inclusive criminal standard raises the same concerns discussed in the vagueness doctrine).
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ment.232 In the 1990s, the United States Trade Representative made a decision not to ask for IP enforcement in China because it feared that IP enforcement would be used as a guise for political repression.233 In the United
States, the prosecution of Aaron Swartz under the overly broad Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”) was viewed by many as retribution for his
involvement in the Stop Online Privacy Act (“SOPA”) protests.234 Overcriminalization of speech allows a government to go after any of its citizens
to prevent behavior that cannot itself be criminalized, creating the same
problem recognized by the Court when a state carved out particular subcategories for enforcement within an otherwise unprotected category of
speech.235 Beyond permitting bad government behavior, the “risk of discriminatory enforcement” can create chilling effects.236
Many copyright scholars implicitly assume copyright “piracy” is oneto-one infringement done in lieu of a purchase, and consequently refuse to
include piracy within the scope of free speech protections.237 But the international legal standard defines “piracy” simply as copyright infringement.238 Unchecked criminal copyright enforcement presents many of the
same speech problems as its civil counterpart.
The secondary effects of overcriminalization of copyright infringement
are an important discussion; however, there are also speech-related problems with the underlying standard itself. Insofar as there is agreement that
copyright overlaps with speech, principles generally used in other speech
areas should be applied. A speaker’s intent is often central to the state’s
ability to punish that speech.239 Usually, the state cannot assume the intent

232. Mike Masnick, Russian Officials Abusing Copyright Law—with Microsoft’s Help—to
Intimidate
Gov’t
Critics,
TECHDIRT
(Sept.
13,
2010,
8:47
AM),
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20100912/12440610969.shtml.
233. Yu, supra note 185, at 1085.
234. Jacob Sloan, Did the Government Target Aaron Swartz over His Role in Defeating
SOPA?, DISINFORMATION (Jan. 28, 2013), http://www.disinfo.com/2013/01/did-the-governmenttarget-aaron-swartz-over-his-role-in-defeating-sopa.
235. R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 37, 384 (1992).
236. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 872 (1997).
237. See Lemley & Volokh, supra note 90, at 211–12 (explaining that piracy is an “[e]asy”
case, and First Amendment due process should not apply where a defendant has made “identical
or nearly identical copies of the plaintiff’s works, and there is no claim of fair use but only some
other copyright defense”); Tushnet, supra note 90, at 567 (“I have no free speech right to download entire works for which I could readily pay.”).
238. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 184, at 342 (“‘[P]irated copyright goods’ shall mean
any goods which are copies made without the consent of the right holder . . . which are made directly or indirectly from an article where the making of that copy would have constituted an infringement of a copyright or a related right.”).
239. See Anjali Dalal, Protecting Hyperlinks and Preserving First Amendment Values on the
Internet, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1017, 1069 (2011) (advocating that “applying the doctrine devel-
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of a speaker, but instead, must demonstrate that intent. Free speech protection often requires the state to establish that a speaker has particularly malicious intent, or intends that his or her speech will produce harmful consequences.240
One prong of the U.S. criminal copyright standard requires only that
the infringer intend to break the law, with no motivation of financial gain.241
This is a low level of intent that might be met, for example, by showing that
the original copyrighted work had an FBI warning explaining that copyright
infringement is a criminal offense. That low level of intent is not reconcilable with historical concerns about intent in free speech jurisprudence.242
To be speech protective in the area of criminal copyright, which is so often
analogized to theft, the standard might require that the infringer intends to
engage in theft rather than speech.
Free speech principles also suggest that for speech to be regulated, it
must have particularly harmful consequences.243 The “substantive evil must
be extremely serious” for free speech protection not to apply.244 Courts
should be wary of impinging upon “speech that . . . creates no victims.”245
The U.S. criminal copyright standard targets copyright infringement
done with the expectation of the receipt of anything of value, regardless of
the scale of infringement and the level of harm to the rights holder.246 The
second prong of the U.S. standard targets infringement done with no malicious motivation, but at a certain scale: $1,000 of aggregate infringement in
180 days. That is not “serious” harm, especially when the $1,000 value estimate is made with an assumption that copyright infringing goods should
be valued at full market value.247 This low standard is justified by the agoped in Sullivan, courts should demand an intent-based standard that requires plaintiffs to show
that defendants possessed the requisite mens rea to facilitate illegal behavior”).
240. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 365 (2003) (rejecting the state’s use of cross burning
as prima facie evidence for intent to intimidate, because the provision “blurs the line between
these two meanings of a burning cross”); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (the
speech must be “directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action”); New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964) (requiring a showing of actual malice on the part of the
reporter for liability to attach to statements made).
241. No Electronic Theft (NET) Act, Pub. L. No. 105-147, 111 Stat. 2678 (1997); 17 U.S.C. §
506(a)(1)(B) (2012).
242. See supra notes 174–178 and accompanying text.
243. See Landmark Commc’ns v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 842 (1978).
244. See Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263 (1941) (establishing a “working principle
that the substantive evil must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high
before utterances can be punished”).
245. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 236 (2002).
246. No Electronic Theft (NET) Act § 2(a), Pub. L. No. 105-147, 111 Stat. 2678 (1997); 17
U.S.C. § 506(a)(1)(B) (2012).
247. Goldman, supra note 195, at 426–27.
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gregate harm to the industry. In the speech context, however, individuals
should not be punished for the aggregate harm done to an industry; they
should be punished only for the harm they themselves create.
IV. THE EXPORTATION OF THE U.S. CRIMINAL COPYRIGHT STANDARD
United States criminal copyright law is speech-restrictive, and the
United States is exporting it. Using the weight of its cultural and economic
power, the United States is in the process of foisting its version of criminal
copyright law on the rest of the world.248 Between 1997 and the present,
the United States has entered into a number of bilateral and plurilateral free
trade agreements that provide a criminal standard more similar to the NET
Act than to the current international standard established in TRIPS. 249
United States free trade agreements, like U.S. law, deviate from the international requirement that countries criminalize copyright infringement
done on a “commercial scale.” Instead, similar to U.S. law, the free trade
agreements split criminal copyright into two parts. The first offense criminalizes infringement done for “commercial advantage or private financial
gain,” with private financial gain often defined as the “receipt of anything
of value.”250 The second offense criminalizes “significant infringement”
with no motivation of financial gain.251
Appendix I shows the extent to which the Office of the United States
Trade Representative has achieved its agenda. The United States currently
has free trade agreements with twenty countries.252 Most of these agreements contain detailed intellectual property provisions, including provisions
on criminal copyright law.253 The three free trade agreements and two regional agreements examined as examples in the appendix do show some
variation, depending on the pushback from the negotiating countries.254 Columbia represents the most stringent criminal standard, followed by Aus-

248. Sell, supra note 168, at 10–12.
249. Id. at 8.
250. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 506(a)(1)(A) (2012).
251. Id. § 506(a)(1)(B). This second definition mimics but does not precisely export its U.S.
equivalent, which penalizes willful reproduction or distribution of over $1,000 in 180 days. Id.
Using the term “significant infringement” instead of this statutory threshold could give other signatory states more autonomy, or could result in a lower threshold for criminal infringement with
no for-profit motive than even the NET Act standard.
252. Free Trade Agreements, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements (last visited Jan. 17, 2014).
253. Trade Agreements, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements (last visited Jan. 17, 2014).
254. See infra Appendix.
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tralia, which resisted the insertion of “private” before “financial gain.”255
Chile achieved several important concessions in its negotiations, including
a footnote explicitly leaving out de minimis infringement, no matter the motive.256 The Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free
Trade Agreement (“CAFTA”) contains a particularly stringent standard,
criminalizing “willful infringements that have no direct or indirect motivation of financial gain, provided that there is more than a de minimis financial harm.”257
While international law currently does not explicitly criminalize aiding
and abetting copyright infringement, the United States recently put forward
provisions in the ACTA criminalizing aiding and abetting copyright infringement by companies.258 This addition targets website owners, as evidenced by recent prosecutions of website owners by U.S. authorities. It can
be expected to appear in future free trade agreements.259 The United States
also exports prior-restraint-like seizure procedures.260 Free trade agreements and the ACTA both contemplate the pre-trial seizure and forfeiture of
materials, likely including websites, used during infringement.261
The exportation of U.S. criminal copyright law not only exports both a
substantive criminal standard and enforcement mechanisms, it also transfers
the U.S. understanding of the nexus between copyright and free expression:
that copyright law receives no speech scrutiny. This approach is increasingly out of line with the public intuition about copyright and free speech.
The U.S. population does not appear to believe that intellectual property crimes are morally wrong.262 By recent industry estimates in 2011, over

255. See infra Appendix.
256. See infra Appendix.
257. See Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement, Ch. 15,
art.
26(a),
Aug.
5,
2004
[hereinafter
CAFTA],
available
at
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/cafta/asset_upload_file934_3935.pdf
(last visited Jan 29, 2014).
258. Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, art. 23(4) [hereinafter ACTA], available at
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/i_property/pdfs/acta1105_en.pdf (last visited Jan. 29,
2014).
259. See supra Part I.
260. See infra Part V.
261. See, e.g., U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement, ch. 17, art. 26(b), May 18, 2004,
431.6.M.1248 [hereinafter Australia FTA], available at tp://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/freetrade-agreements/australian-fta/final-text; U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement, ch. 17, art. 22(c),
June 6, 2003, 421.6.M.1026 [hereinafter Chile FTA], available at http://www.ustr.gov/tradeagreements/free-trade-agreements/chile-fta/final-text; ACTA supra note 258, at arts. 25(1), 25(3).
262. Stuart P. Green, Plagiarism, Norms, and the Limits of Theft Law: Some Observations on
the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 167,
238 (2002); Hardy, supra note 194, at 306–08; Pyun, supra note 196, at 390–91; see also Tom R.
Tyler, Compliance with Intellectual Property Laws: A Psychological Perspective, 29 N.Y.U. J.
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17% of U.S. Internet traffic is IP-infringing.263 One-third of the U.S. population under 30 finds sharing music acceptable; one-quarter of Internet users
aged 30-49 engage in file sharing; and 12% of users over 50 file share.264
The nature of intellectual property and the ways in which it differs
from real property also contribute to the moral ambiguity of IP infringement.265 While Congress may repeatedly use the analogy of real property
theft,266 the general public is ambivalent about equating copyright to property.267 People have instincts about property, obtained from decades of personal experience with ownership rights in tangible objects and face-to-face
transactions.268 Intellectual property infringement, however, often involves
intangible objects and an aggregate harm rather than face-to-face transactions and individualized harm, and is therefore not intuitively perceived as
morally equivalent to real property theft.269 Appreciating the aggregate effect of one’s actions does not come naturally, so infringers rarely feel guilty
for these actions.270
People appear to have a strong speech intuition that is invoked by excessive copyright enforcement. Recent protest movements in the United
States and abroad successfully galvanized millions by describing copyright
enforcement as “censorship.”
Two recent mass protest movements show how the public’s speech intuition has been harnessed to criticize copyright enforcement. The SOPA
was the latest in a series of copyright enforcement bills that proposed blocking domain name service (“DNS”) to websites alleged to be bad actors.271
DNS-blocking functionally shuts down a website, although users in the
know can easily route around the blockage.272 To obtain a court order to
block U.S.-directed sites, the United States Attorney General would allege
INT’L L. & POL. 219, 225 (1997) (discussing the moral judgments of people in the United States
and how such judgments shape law-related behavior).
263. Rufo, supra note 200, at 530.
264. Id.
265. Hardy, supra note 194, at 326; Moohr, supra note 171, at 766.
266. See Manta, supra note 189, at 473 (noting that policymakers rely on the property analogy
and theft analogy).
267. Hardy, supra note 194, at 326.
268. Id. at 332.
269. Id. at 332, 338.
270. Id. at 338.
271. See Yochai Benkler, Seven Lessons from SOPA/PIPA/Megaupload and Four Proposals
on
Where
We
Go
from
Here,
TECHPRESIDENT
(Jan.
25
2012),
http://techpresident.com/news/21680/seven-lessons-sopapipamegauplaod-and-four-proposalswhere-we-go-here; see also David G. Robinson, Following the Money: A Better Way Forward on
the PROTECT IP Act, 24 (Sept. 18, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1930013.
272. Id. at 2.
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criminal copyright infringement or facilitation of criminal copyright infringement.273
From November 16, 2011, the first day of House hearings on the
SOPA, to January 18, 2012, a growing coalition of political insiders and
popular outsiders used the Internet and the cause of preventing censorship
to rally U.S. citizens against the SOPA legislation.274 Activists, not lawyers, proposed the censorship framework.275 The censorship framing reflected a popular intuition that enforcement encroached on speech rights,
not a legal argument that SOPA violated the First Amendment.276 The coalition was able to point to existing examples of web censorship done in the
name of copyright enforcement, such as the yearlong takedown of the music
blog Dajaz1.com.277
The first popular protest against SOPA occurred in November 2011,
on the eve of the first House hearings. Advocates from Fight for the Future
proposed calling the day “American Censorship Day” and encouraged sites
to adopt “stop censorship” banners.278 Four million people visited the
AmericanCensorship.org site on the day of the hearing, and multiple companies joined in the protest.279
As of January 18, 2012, however, eighty members of Congress still
supported SOPA and only thirty-one opposed it.280 That same day, more
than 15,000 websites went dark in a coalition-organized protest of SOPA;

273. James Temple, Stop Online Piracy Act Would Stop Online Innovation, SFGATE (Nov. 2,
2011, 4:00 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/business/article/Stop-Online-Piracy-Act-would-stoponline-2324440.php.
274. See Susan K. Sell, Revenge of the “Nerds”: Collective Action Against Intellectual Property Maximalism in the Global Information Age, 15 INT’L STUD. REV. 67, 68–69, 72 (2013)
(providing a list of SOPA’s opponents). See generally EDWARD LEE, THE FIGHT FOR THE
FUTURE: HOW PEOPLE DEFEATED HOLLYWOOD AND SAVED THE INTERNET—FOR NOW 2–4
(2013) (describing how people organized the largest Internet protest in history, plus the largest
single-day demonstration on the streets of twenty-seven countries of the European Union).
275. See Cindy Cohn, Address at the Yale Law School Information Society Project (Feb. 14,
2013), available at http://ylsqtss.law.yale.edu:8080/qtmedia/isp/ISPCohen021413_s.mov (explaining that Fight for the Future advocates, not attorneys, proposed labeling SOPA “censorship”).
276. Id. A First Amendment argument was later suggested by academics. See Laurence H.
Tribe, The “Stop Online Piracy Act” (SOPA) Violates the First Amendment 1–4 (Dec. 6, 2011)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/75153093/Tribe-Legis-Memoon-SOPA-12-6-11-1 (listing several provisions of SOPA that violate the First Amendment).
277. Masnick, supra note 205.
278. Parker Higgins, American Censorship Day Is This Wednesday—And You Can Join In!,
ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER
FOUNDATION
(Nov.
10,
2011),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/11/american-censorship-day-wednesday-and-you-can-join.
279. Sell, supra note 274, at 76.
280. Josh Constine, SOPA Protests Sway Congress: 31 Opponents Yesterday, 122 Now,
TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 19, 2012), http://techcrunch.com/2012/01/19/sopa-opponents-supporters.
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Google and Craigslist featured censorship bars on their homepages.281 Over
five million signatures supported Google’s online petition against SOPA.282
By Friday of that week, Congress shelved SOPA and its Senate counterpart,
the Protect IP Act (“PIPA”).283
The defeat of SOPA roused a transnational coalition that had already
been fighting against another significant copyright enforcement effort, the
ACTA.284 Negotiated outside of existing international institutions as a large
trade agreement, ACTA attempted to ratchet up international copyright,
trademark, and patent standards and enforcement measures, including border measures and criminal enforcement.285 Eight participating countries,
including the United States, signed ACTA in October 2011.286 The European Union and its member states had not yet signed ACTA when SOPA
failed in the United States.287
On January 26, 2012, twenty-one member states of the EU, including
the UK, signed ACTA.288 In the three days leading up to signature, protests
similar to the anti-SOPA protests broke out across Europe. In Poland,
crowds of thousands of young people gathered, many holding up banners
protesting censorship.289 Some put tape over their mouths to signify their
fears.290 As more of Europe considered adopting ACTA, protests mounted.291 In Croatia, demonstrators carried banners reading, “Stop internet
censorship.”292 In Warsaw, banners read “Down with censorship” and

281. Sell, supra note 274, at 77.
282. Id.
283. Jonathan Weisman, Antipiracy Bills Delayed After an Online Firestorm, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 21, 2012, at B6.
284. Adam Clark Estes, SOPA Stopped for Now, Anti-Censorship Activists Turn to ACTA,
THE WIRE (Jan. 26, 2012, 10:20 AM), http://www.thewire.com/technology/2012/01/sopastopped-now-anti-censorship-activists-turn-acta/47892/.
285. Kaminski, supra note 168, at 401–10.
286. David Kravets, US Signs ACTA, ARSTECHNICA (Oct. 4, 2011, 5:00 PM),
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2011/10/us-signs-international-anti-piracy-accord.
287. Id.
288. Charles Arthur, ACTA Protests Break Out as EU States Sign Up to Treaty, THE
GUARDIAN (Jan. 27, 2012, 4:43 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2012/jan/27/actaprotests-eu-states-sign-treaty.
289. Thousands March in Poland over ACTA Internet Treaty, BBC NEWS EUROPE (Jan. 26,
2012, 10:40 AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-16735219.
290. Vanessa Gera, ACTA Protests in Poland: Groups Fear Copyright Treaty Will Lead to
Censorship,
HUFFINGTON
POST
(Jan.
24,
2012,
2:51
PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/24/acta-protests-poland_n_1229110.html.
291. Charles Arthur, ACTA Criticised After Thousands Protest in Europe, THE GUARDIAN
(Feb. 13, 2012, 2:37 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2012/feb/13/acta-protestseurope.
292. Id.
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“Free internet.”293 Protests also occurred in Paris, Budapest, and Prague.294
One article hypothesized that Eastern European countries and Germany
were particularly sensitive about the intertwined history of state enforcement and surveillance.295
A coalition of insiders and outsiders harnessed the power of the Internet under the framework of “censorship” to stop the ACTA treaty in Europe.296 In 2012, the European Parliament rejected the ACTA, and it died
in Europe when the European Court of Justice refused to hear claims.297
These examples show that people around the world mobilized to protest copyright enforcement under the banner of free speech. The First
Amendment approach to copyright has diverged not only from the international approach, but also from these popular intuitions about copyright and
speech. Congress formed the current U.S. criminal copyright law with no
judicial scrutiny and at odds with what the public sees as speech rights. The
United States is using its strengths to export that law, and the international
public is beginning to visibly push back.
V. PATHOLOGIES OF THE CATEGORICAL APPROACH
The story of criminal copyright and the First Amendment provides an
important point of comparison between the categorical approach to constitutional analysis and proportionality review. Categorical analysis can, in
borderline cases, foster a divide between the popular understanding of
rights and judicial protection. When there is an imbalance between the legislature and the judiciary, the legislature may exploit that imbalance until
the popular understanding of speech rights is broader than the judicial understanding.298 Categorical analysis can thus give rise to a gap between
popular perception and judicial doctrine on fundamental rights.
The categorical approach to the First Amendment fails to permit courts
to step in when the state criminalizes speech that should be subject to lesser
sanctions. The U.S. doctrinal lack of sensitivity to the scope of penalties,
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. See id. (observing that “the accord has sparked concerns, especially in Eastern European
countries as well as in Germany which is sensitive about its history with the Gestapo and Stasi
secret police, over online censorship and increased surveillance”).
296. See Mike Palmedo, Mapping of Web Space Around the ACTA Debate, INFOJUSTICE.ORG
(Jan. 3, 2013), http://infojustice.org/archives/28226.
297. Margot Kaminski, Positive Proposals for Treatment of Online Intermediaries 5–6 (Program on Info. Justice and Intellectual Prop., Am. Univ. Wash. Coll. Law, Research Paper No.
2012-05, 2012), available at http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article
=1029&context=research.
298. See supra Part I.A.
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and whether they are administered by the state or a private actor, is a consequence of categorical reasoning.299
When categorical reasoning is combined with a complicated statutory
regime, judges are particularly likely to abdicate analysis and defer to the
legislature. Statutory regimes leave less room for judicial discretion in balancing rights, because such discretion is constrained by potential conflict
with the legislature.300 Copyright law is the perfect storm, where a detailed
statutory regime meets categorical reasoning.
I do not claim that proportionality analysis is always more speechprotective. For non-borderline cases, categorical analysis protects more
speech because it protects speech until that speech falls into a clearly delineated unprotected category.301 Proportionality analysis, by contrast, requires that courts balance speech against other rights or government purposes—it does not dictate that speech always trumps other rights.302 Thus,
when foreign courts weigh copyright against speech, the strength of the European justifications for copyright can in fact trump speech concerns, especially where a court views the speech claim as weaker because the speech at
hand is commercial.303 But proportionality analysis is more speechprotective of unprotected speech, in its ability to permit judicial review and
prevent judicial abdication over categorically unprotected speech.304
I also do not claim that the United States is alone in having an overeager legislature on copyright matters. Other countries have criminal copyright standards that overcriminalize.305 In those countries subject to proportionality analysis, however, courts provide a mechanism for challenging the
enforcement of those laws and a framework for evaluating whether they are
disproportionate as speech regulation.
The recent example of the ECHR’s consideration of the Pirate Bay application, described by the court as one of the world’s largest file sharing
services on the Internet, shows how other courts examine the proportionality of criminal copyright sanctions that have gone effectively unexamined in
the United States.

299. But see Coenen, supra note 68, at 1000 n.32 (taking the position that penalty-sensitive
free speech analysis need not result in a proportionality analysis, but rather that this failure to distinguish between levels of sanctions is a result of the categorical approach, and thus antithetical to
it).
300. Balganesh, supra note 155, at 1578.
301. See supra Part I.A.
302. See supra Part I.B.
303. See, e.g., supra note 103.
304. See supra Part I.B.
305. See infra Appendix.
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Two founders of the Pirate Bay application were convicted in Sweden
of crimes in violation of the Copyright Act, sentenced to prison, and fined
several million Euros.306 The ECHR recognized that the convictions interfered with the right to freedom of expression.307 It found, however, that the
convictions were prescribed by law and pursued a legitimate aim.308 The
court then weighed the applicant’s interest in freedom of expression against
the state’s interest in protecting the rights of copyright-holders.309 It found
that the Swedish state benefits from a wide margin of appreciation—a deferential standard of review—because it was balancing competing interests.310 The ECHR concluded that the prison sentence and award of damages could not be regarded as disproportionate, in large part because the apapplicants had not taken any action to remove torrent files despite having
been urged to do so.311 Thus it declared the application inadmissible as ill
founded.312 Notably, however, the court appeared to consider the fact that
other enforcement measures had not worked, before declaring the prison
sentence proportionate.313
The scope of U.S. criminal copyright law demonstrates several failings
of the categorical approach with regard to speech that falls outside of the
First Amendment. Judicial abdication through categorical reasoning has
permitted an overactive legislature to pass disproportionately punitive laws
impacting speech.314 Courts have few doctrinal options to use to declare
copyright criminalization disproportionate. Unscrutinized criminalization
allows state surveillance and other speech-related abuse. This disproportionate standard has begun to collide with public speech intuitions.315 Efforts to spread the U.S. criminal regime internationally will fail if the regime continues to be seen by the public as impinging on free speech. Other
regimes that use proportionality analysis should scrutinize the U.S. approach to criminal copyright law, recognizing that it contains implicit assumptions about the relationship between copyright and freedom of speech.
The United States itself may want to adopt features of proportionality
analysis for speech that is currently considered outside the First Amend306. Neij v. Sweden, App. No. 40397/12, Eur. Ct. H.R., (Feb 19, 2013), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-117513.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Id. at 10–11.
310. Id.
311. Id. at 11–12.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. See supra Part I.
315. See supra Part III.
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ment’s protection. This would not be as inconsistent with current doctrine
as it might first seem. The Supreme Court recognized in Reno that criminalizing speech is problematic,316 and recognized in Stanley v. Georgia317
that a state cannot use all enforcement methods at its disposal, even against
categorically unprotected speech.318
In cases where a legislature criminalizes speech that is categorically
rejected from the First Amendment’s protection, U.S. courts should look
closer to enforcement standards, instead of abdicating scrutiny. Courts
could give credence to the notion that criminalization is itself worth inspecting, even for categorically unprotected speech. Rather than employing ad
hoc reasoning, courts could look, even within rational basis review, to how
First Amendment doctrine maps onto existing bodies of pertinent law, such
as criminalization theory, which describes when governments should criminalize acts instead of subjecting them to civil sanctions. The Supreme
Court has peered within categorically unprotected speech before, but with
no apparent principles. Using principled balancing, U.S. courts could examine whether and when criminalization is constitutionally permitted.
There may be additional places in U.S. speech law for proportionality
principles; this Article begins a larger project to determine when and where
they might apply.
VI. CONCLUSION
A surprising situation has developed in which the United States has established a primitive copyright–free speech interface that it is now exporting to the rest of the world. The free speech approach used in other countries is, perhaps unexpectedly, more adept at handling copyright law. The
U.S. exportation of its criminal copyright standard is also an exportation of
its understanding that copyright enforcement should not be balanced against
speech.
The United States might take advantage of the insights from proportionality analysis by importing a structured form of balancing back into
First Amendment doctrine. It is not the position of this Article that the First
Amendment import balancing tests wholeheartedly, as many elements of
the categorical approach are highly speech protective. Importing balancing
to analysis of speech currently abandoned by the First Amendment, however, could solve the problems addressed in this Article. For the moment, the
316. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 886 (1997) (“[W]e presume that governmental regulation of the content of speech is more likely to interfere with the free exchange of ideas than to encourage it.”).
317. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
318. Id. at 559–60.
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United States is becoming the clear world outlier on copyright enforcement,
and this is indicative of a larger pathology in the way the United States
handles free speech.
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Appendix. Piracy Statutes

TRIPS319

Willful?

For Profit?

Scale of
Offense

Remedies

Pre-trial
Seizure and
Forfeiture

Yes.

Unclear:
“piracy . . . on
a commercial
scale”

Commercial
scale

Imprisonment
and/or monetary
fine,
“consistently
with the level of
penalties
applied for
crimes of a
corresponding
gravity”

No. Criminal
None
forfeiture only.
Seizure and
forfeiture shall
be available as a
“remed[y]”
(presumably
after a trial and
thus criminal
forfeiture not
civil), in
“appropriate
cases” where
infringement
was the
“predominant
use” of
material.

Imprisonment
and fines

Yes, established
in the PRO-IP
Act Sec.
2323.322 “any
property used,
or intended to
be used, in any
manner . . . to
commit or
facilitate the
commission of
an offense”

U.S. Law: Yes.
NET
Act;320
PRO-IP
of
2008.321

None. Just
One work is
infringement
enough.
of more than
$1,000 in 180
days. Where
there is a
motive and no
minimum, it is
for
commercial
advantage or
private
financial gain,
where private
financial gain
includes the
receipt of
anything of
value.

319. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 184.
320. No Electronic Theft (NET) Act, Pub. L. No. 105-147, 111 Stat. 2678 (1997).

Aiding
and
Abetting

Removed
from
copyright
law in
1976;
however,
federal
aiding and
abetting
statute (18
U.S.C.
§2) has
been
applied.
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Willful?

For Profit?

Scale of
Offense

Remedies

Pre-trial
Seizure and
Forfeiture

Aiding
and
Abetting

Yes.

“at least those
carried out as
commercial
activities for
direct or
indirect
economic or
commercial
advantage”

“commercial scale,”
but includes
“indirect
economic
...
advantage”

“imprison-ment
as well as
monetary fines
sufficiently high
to provide a
deterrent . . .
consistently
with the level of
penalties
applied for
crimes of a
corresponding
gravity”

Probably: “its
competent
authorities have
the authority to
order the
seizure of . . .
any related
materials and
implements
used in the
commission of
the alleged
offence”324 and
“its competent
authorities have
the authority to
order the
forfeiture or
destruction of
all counterfeit
trademark
goods or pirated
copyright
goods.”325 No
word of these
forfeitures
being after trial.

States
must
criminalize aiding
and
abetting of
copyright
infringement.326
Legal
persons
(companies) must
be held
liable for
criminal
infringement and
aiding and
abetting.327

321. Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual Property (PRO-IP) Act of 2008,
Pub. L. No. 110-403, 112 Stat. 4256, available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW110publ403/pdf/PLAW-110publ403.pdf.
322. Id. § 206(a) (quoting Section 2323 of the PRO-IP Act).
323. See supra note 258, at art. 23(1).
324. Id. at art. 25(1).
325. Id. at art. 25(3).
326. Id. at art. 23(4).
327. Id. at art. 23(5).
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Willful?

For Profit?

Scale of
Offense

Remedies

Pre-trial
Seizure and
Forfeiture

Yes.

None, and
need not be
significant in
size.
“[W]illful
infringe-ments
that have no
direct or
indirect
motivation of
financial gain,
provided that
there is more
than a de
minimis
financial
harm.”

“commercial scale
includes
significant
willful
infringements of
copyright or
related
rights, for
purposes of
commercial
advantage or
private
financial
gain, as well
as willful
infringements that
have no
direct or
indirect
motivation of
financial
gain,
provided that
there is more
than a de
minimis
financial
harm”

“imprisonment
or monetary
fines, or both,
sufficient to
provide a
deterrent to
future acts of
infringement”

“its judicial
None.
authorities shall
have the
authority to
order the
seizure of
suspected
counterfeit or
pirated goods,
any related
materials and
implements that
have been used
in the
commission of
the offense, any
assets traceable
to the infringing
activity, and
any
documentary
evidence
relevant to the
offense. Each
Party shall
provide that
items that are
subject to
seizure pursuant
to any such
judicial order
need not be
individually
identified so
long as they fall
within general
categories
specified in the
order.”

328. CAFTA, supra note 257.

Aiding
and
Abetting
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329.
330.
331.
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Willful?

For Profit?

Scale of
Offense

Remedies

Pre-trial
Seizure and
Forfeiture

Yes.

None, if
“significant
wilful
infringements
. . . that have
no direct or
indirect
motivation of
financial
gain”330

“[C]ommerci
al scale” is
defined as
including
“willful
infringements for the
purposes of
commercial
advantage or
financial
gain.”331
Note that this
does not
include
private
financial
gain, but
does define
financial
gain broadly
as including
indirect gain.

Imprisonment
and monetary
fines
“sufficiently
high to provide
a deterrent to
infringement”

Probably:
No aiding
“judicial
and
authorities shall abetting
have the
authority to
order the
seizure of
suspected . . .
goods, any
related
materials and
implements that
have been used
in the
commission of
the offence”332

Australia FTA, supra note 261.
Id. at art. 26(a)(i).
Id. at art. 26(a)(ii).
Id. at art. 26(b).

Aiding
and
Abetting
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333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
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Willful?

For Profit?

Scale of
Offense

Remedies

Pre-trial
Seizure and
Forfeiture

Yes.

None, if
significant
infringement
“significant
aggregate
monetary
value,
calculated
based on the
legitimate
retail value of
the infringed
goods”334

“[C]ommercial scale” is
defined as
including
infringement done
“for a
commercial
advantage or
financial
gain.” Note
that this is
not private
financial
gain. Crucial
footnote 34
excludes de
minimis
infringements and
mentions
prosecutorial
discretion.335

“Imprisonment
and/or monetary
fines that are
sufficient to
provide a
deterrent to
future
infringements
and present a
level of
punishment
consistent with
the gravity of
the offense”336

Probably:
No aiding
“judicial
and
authorities have abetting
the authority to
order the
seizure of
suspected . . .
pirated goods
. . . assets
legally traceable
to the infringing
activity. . . and
implements that
constitute
evidence of the
offense.337

Chile FTA, supra note 261.
Id. at art. 22(a)(ii).
Id. at art. 22(a)(i) n.34.
Id. at art. 22(b).
Id. at art. 22(c).

Aiding
and
Abetting
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Willful?

For Profit?

Scale of
Offense

Remedies

Pre-trial
Seizure and
Forfeiture

Yes.

None, if
significant
infringement
“significant
willful . . .
infringements
that have no
direct or
indirect
motivation of
financial gain”
and “willful
infringements
for purposes
of commercial
advantage or
private
financial
gain”339

“Commercial scale”
but defined
as
“significant”
OR infringements done
“for purposes
of . . . private
financial
gain,”
effectively
getting rid of
“commercial scale.”340

“Imprisonment
as well as
monetary fines
sufficient to
provide a
deterrent to
future
infringements”

Probably:
No aiding
“judicial
and
authorities shall abetting
have the
authority to
order the
seizure of
suspected . . .
pirated goods,
any related
materials and
implements that
have been used
in the
commission of
the offense”.
Using the word
“suspected”
indicates this is
pre-trial.

341

Aiding
and
Abetting

338. U.S.-Columbia Free Trade Agreement, ch. 16, Nov. 22, 2006, available at
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/colombia-fta/final-text.
339. Id. at art. 26.
340. Id.
341. Id. at art. 27(a).

